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This Article examines the compatibility of Western antitrust 
models as incorporated in China’s first comprehensive antitrust 
law—the Antimonopoly Law (“AML”)—with China’s local 
conditions.  It identifies three forces that shape competition law 
and policy in China:  China’s current transitional stage, China’s 
market structures, and pervasive state control in China’s economy.  
This Article discusses how these forces have limited the 
applicability of Western antitrust models to China in three major 
areas of antitrust:  cartels, abuse of dominant market position, and 
merger review.  Specifically, it details how these forces have 
prevented China from pursuing a rigorous anti-cartel policy, how 
they have led to a mismatch between monopoly abuses that are 
prohibited under the AML and monopoly abuses that are most 
prevalent in China’s economy, and how they have prevented the 
merger review process under the AML from being meaningfully 
applied to domestic firms.  This Article demonstrates that despite 
having a Western-style antitrust law, China has not developed and 
likely will not develop a Western-style antitrust jurisprudence in 
the near future due to these local conditions.  Finally, the Article 
explains how China developed a consensus on the need for a 
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formal antitrust law despite local conditions that were not entirely 
compatible with such a law. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Legal transplants, or “the moving of a rule or system of law 
from one country to another, or from one people to another,”1 are 
commonly observed around the world.  Examples of legal 
transplants can be found on many different levels, from the 
borrowing of an entire legal system2 to the borrowing of an entire 
area of law3 and to the borrowing of individual legal concepts or 
practices.4
 
1 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21 
(1974). 
  Indeed, it has been argued that “at most times, in most 
2 See ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN PRIVATE LAW 193 (Expanded 
ed. 2001) (“From the eleventh century to the eighteenth and even beyond, the 
main feature of legal change in western continental Europe was the Reception of 
Roman law.”).  Similarly, much of American law was originally borrowed from 
England.  See Alan Watson, The Importance of “Nutshells,” 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 14–
15 (1994) (arguing that a prominent English law treatise was immensely 
influential to the development of American common law which was founded 
largely in English common law).  
3 For an example of the borrowing of an entire area of law, see Hideki Kanda 
& Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reexamining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in 
Japanese Corporate Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 437, 437 (Daniel H. 
Foote ed., 2007) (discussing the importation by Japan of its original Commercial 
Code from Germany in 1898 as an element of a fundamental overhaul of its legal 
systems). 
4 See, e.g., Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community 
Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 451 
(1999) (arguing for EU adoption of American concepts of notice and comment 
rulemaking); John D. Jackson, Playing the Culture Card in Resisting Cross-
Jurisdictional Transplants: A Comment on “Legal Processes and National Culture,” 5 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 51 (1997) (arguing that the influence of cultural 
distinctions may not hinder transplantation of law as greatly as some scholars 
might suspect); Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative 
Law and Economics, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994) (examining the role of 
economic efficiency in transnational borrowing of property law doctrines); Julie 
Mertus & Elizabeth Breier-Sharlow, Power, Legal Transplants and Harmonization, 81 
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 477 (2004) (discussing adoption and transplantation of U.S. 
law concepts and doctrines by NAFTA); James A. F. Nafziger, International and 
Foreign Law Right Here in River City, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 4, 11–12 (1998) 
(discussing Karl Llewellyn’s borrowing of German doctrines into U.S. contract 
law); Joel M. Ngugi, Promissory Estoppel: The Life History of an Ideal Legal Transplant, 
41 U. RICH. L. REV. 425 (2007) (discussing the American concept of promissory 
estoppel as a transplant from the general English concept of estoppel); Martin 
Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirements, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179 (1992) 
(discussing European borrowing of American approaches to administrative law 
and judicial review); Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 37 (1993) (discussing transnational borrowing of administrative law 
concepts); Jack B. Weinstein & Jonathan B. Wiener, Of Sailing Ships and Seeking 
Facts: Brief Reflections on Magistrates and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 ST. 
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places, borrowing from a different jurisdiction has been the 
principal way in which law has developed.”5
Among all areas of law, antitrust law is arguably “one of the 
best examples of legal transplants and convergence.”
 
6  Having its 
origin in the United States as a response to industrial concentration 
and social changes during the mid- to late-nineteenth century,7 
antitrust law has now been adopted in more than one hundred 
jurisdictions.8  The proliferation of antitrust law has been 
particularly notable since the early 1980s, when a number of 
developing countries and former communist countries adopted an 
antitrust regime.9
 
JOHN’S L. REV. 429 (1988) (discussing American borrowing of the British approach 
to court-appointed masters and magistrates).  
 
5 ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE 98 (2d ed. 2001). 
6 JOHN O. HALEY, ANTITRUST IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS, 
1947–1998, at 172 (2001). 
7 For discussions of the industrial and social conditions that led to the 
“genesis” of antitrust law in the United States, see Lawrence A. Sullivan & 
Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the Growth of the Antitrust Idea, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
197, 199–208 (1998). 
8 As of 2004, 102 countries had an antitrust law.  Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, 
Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws 
and Their Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 326–31 tbl.A4 (2007). 
9 See generally JOHN FINGLETON ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE (1996) (discussing the progress of 
competition law and policy in four central European countries); Carolyn 
Brzezinski, Competition and Antitrust Law in Central Europe: Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1129 (1994) (discussing the role 
of competition law in post-socialist economic reform in Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary); Malcolm B. Coate et al., Antitrust in Latin 
America: Regulating Government and Business, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 37 
(1992) (discussing antitrust law in Latin American countries and arguing for the 
adoption of a hybrid antitrust policy that focuses on monopoly); Sergio Garcia-
Rodriguez, Mexico’s New Institutional Framework for Antitrust Enforcement, 44 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1149 (1995) (discussing Mexico’s enactment of the Federal Law of 
Economic Competition, which serves as Mexico’s antitrust law); Trudi 
Hartzenberg, Competition Policy and Practice in South Africa: Promoting Competition 
for Development, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 667 (2006) (discussing the adoption and 
enforcement of the 1998 Competition Act in South Africa); Youngjin Jung & Seung 
Wha Chang, Korea’s Competition Law and Policies in Perspective, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 687 (2006) (discussing Korean competition law and its interaction with 
economic policies); William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy, Economic Development, 
and the Transition to Free Markets in the Third World: The Case of Zimbabwe, 61 
ANTITRUST L.J. 253 (1992) (discussing Zimbabwe’s consideration of a new antitrust 
regime); William E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and Consumer 
Protection Reforms in Transitional Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, 
Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197 (1995) (discussing efforts to draft or 
reform competition law in Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe); William E. 
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The latest major country to join the expanding antitrust club is 
China, whose first comprehensive antitrust law, the Antimonopoly 
Law (“AML”), was adopted on August 30, 2007 and went into 
effect on August 1, 2008.10  To a large extent, the AML bears the 
hallmarks of a legal transplant.  Like antitrust laws in most 
jurisdictions, the AML contains provisions dealing with restraints 
or potential restraints on competition in areas that are often 
referred to as the “three pillars” of antitrust:  agreements in 
restraint of trade,11 abuse of dominant market position,12
 
Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly Communist 
and Socialist Countries, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 437 (1996) (discussing 
difficulties encountered in the creation and execution of competition policy 
systems in formerly communist and socialist countries and suggesting ways of 
overcoming these obstacles); Deunden Nikomborirak, The Political Economy of 
Competition Law: The Case of Thailand, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 597 (2006) 
(discussing problems with the implementation of competition law in Thailand); 
Gesner Oliveira & Thomas Fujiwara, Competition Policy in Developing Economies: 
The Case of Brazil, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 619 (2006) (discussing how Brazil has 
overcome challenges typically encountered when trying to implement 
competition policy in a developing economy); Alice Pham, The Development of 
Competition Law in Vietnam in the Face of Economic Reforms and Global Integration, 26 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 547 (2006) (discussing competition law in Vietnam in the 
context of economic reform and globalization).  
 and 
10 Fanlongduan Fa [Antimonopoly Law] ch. 1, art. 1 (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 517 (China), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.htm [hereinafter AML].  
For general discussions of the AML and its major provisions, see Xiaoye Wang, 
Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 133 (2008) and 
Zhenguo Wu, Perspectives on the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 73 
(2008). 
11 The term used by the AML for agreements in restraint of trade is 
“monopoly agreements” (longduan xieyi).  In Chapter 2, the AML prohibits two 
types of monopoly agreements.  Article 13 of the AML prohibits agreements 
among undertakings that are in a competitive relationship with one another, i.e., 
“horizontal agreements.”  AML, supra note 10, art. 13.  Article 14 of the AML 
prohibits agreements among undertakings that are at different stages in the 
production or sales process, i.e., “vertical agreements.”  Id. art. 14; see also Wang, 
supra note 10, at 136 (stating that, like its German counterpart, the AML separates 
horizontal and vertical agreements); Wu, supra note 10, at 80–81 (discussing the 
separate treatment of horizontal and vertical agreements in Articles 13 and 14, 
respectively, of the AML). 
12 In Chapter 3, the AML prohibits certain practices that are considered 
abuses of dominant market position, including excessive pricing, predatory 
pricing, refusal to deal, exclusive dealing, tying, and price discrimination.  AML, 
supra note 10, ch. 3; see infra note 227 and accompanying text; see also Wang, supra 
note 10, at 137–38 (analyzing Articles 17 to 19 of the AML); Wu, supra note 10, at 
85 (discussing specific practices of dominant market position contained in the 
AML).   
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mergers.13  Specifically, the AML’s provisions on agreements in 
restraint of trade and abuse of dominant market position borrow 
heavily from Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union,14 and the AML’s provisions on mergers 
“appear to be drawn from the European Union Merger 
Regulation.”15  Some specific provisions of the AML show 
influences of U.S. and Japanese antitrust laws as well.16  To be sure, 
the AML contains provisions addressing issues or considerations 
peculiar to China,17 the chief ones being the provisions prohibiting 
“administrative monopolies,” or anticompetitive conduct by 
government agencies.18
But do legal transplants work?  This question has been 
thoroughly debated by generations of scholars, with some taking 
  But given the prominence and salience of 
the provisions that are borrowed from Western antitrust laws, the 
AML can be said to be largely a legal transplant shaped in the 
mold of Western antitrust laws.  
 
13 In Chapter 4, the AML provides for a merger notification and review 
regime.  AML, supra note 10, ch. 4; see also Wang, supra note 10, at 139–42 
(detailing the AML’s treatment of mergers and acquisitions in Articles 20 to 31 of 
the AML); Wu, supra note 10, at 87–88 (stating that the AML has provided for a 
notification system of “operator concentration”).   
14 See Susan Beth Farmer, The Evolution of Chinese Merger Notification 
Guidelines: A Work in Progress Integrating Global Consensus and Domestic Imperatives, 
18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 6 (2009) (noting that the AML’s provisions on 
restraints in trade “borrow heavily from articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community”).  
15 Id. at 9 n.43.   
16 For example, Article 46 of the AML provides that business operators 
committing a violation may receive a lesser punishment or be exempt from 
punishment altogether if they voluntarily report the violation to the antimonopoly 
enforcement agency.  See Salil K. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust 
Functionalism: Reconsidering China’s Antimonopoly Law, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 379, 398 
n.81 (2009) (noting that this provision draws on the “leniency” policy in the 
United States).  In another example, Article 15(5) exempts agreements reached for 
solving severe sales declines and excess capacities during economic recessions 
from the AML’s prohibition of agreements in restraint of trade.  AML, supra note 
10, art. 15(5).  This approval of “recession cartels” appears to be borrowed from 
Section 24–3 (now repealed) of the Antimonopoly Law of Japan.  See infra note 122 
and accompanying text. 
17 For detailed discussions of these provisions, see Peter J. Wang et al., New 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, JONES DAY (Oct. 2007), http://www.jonesday.com 
/newsknowledge/publicationdetail.aspx?publication=4662. 
18 AML, supra note 10, arts. 32–37.  For general discussions of administrative 
monopolies or government restraints in China, see Eleanor M. Fox, An Anti-
Monopoly Law for China—Scaling the Walls of Government Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 173 (2008).   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss2/5
ZHENG.DOC 1/13/2011 6:47 PM 
2010] TRANSPLANTING ANTITRUST IN CHINA 649 
an extremely optimistic view that legal transplants are socially easy 
because “legal rules are not peculiarly devised for the particular 
society in which they now operate,”19 and some taking an 
extremely pessimistic view that legal transplants are simply 
“impossible.”20  When it comes to the transplant of antitrust law, 
there appear to be different opinions as to its feasibility as well.  On 
one hand, sovereign governments, primarily those of the United 
States and the European Union, have advocated or even required 
the adoption of their preferred model of antitrust (which usually 
means their own) in other economies,21 and international 
organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (“OECD”) and the International Competition 
Network (“ICN”) have engaged in efforts to “harmonize” antitrust 
law across jurisdictions.22
 
19 WATSON, supra note 1, at 96. 
  The implicit assumption in both sets of 
20 See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’, 4 MAASTRICHT J. 
EUR. & COMP. L. 111, 113–14 (1997) (disagreeing with Watson’s formalist view of 
law in regard to legal transplants and thus concluding that because rules are what 
they are in that they cannot travel, “legal transplants are impossible”). 
21 For example, during the early 1990s, the United States and the European 
Union were engaged in heated competition to sell their respective version of 
antitrust law to central and eastern European countries that were moving away 
from command economies.  See Eleanor M. Fox, The Central European Nations and 
the EU Waiting Room—Why Must the Central European Nations Adopt the Competition 
Law of the European Union?, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 351, 351 (1997) (explaining that 
when central European countries switched over to democratic systems, “many 
Americans urged the post-communist nations to adopt U.S. style antitrust rules, 
while Europeans suggested that the competition law of the European Community 
(EC) was a better fit.”); Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International 
Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KANSAS L. REV. 557, 569–70 
(1994) (discussing the initiative of the U.S. government to get post-communist 
European countries to adopt antitrust laws similar to American ones in opposition 
to the European Union’s approach).  In 1990, as part of an agreement between the 
United States and Japan aimed at removing structural barriers in the Japanese 
market, the United States required Japan to move the enforcement of its 
antimonopoly law in the direction of U.S. antitrust law.  Id. at 571–72.  During the 
early 1990s, when a number of Latin American countries were revising or 
considering revising their antitrust policies, economists from the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission nominally advocated a hybrid of U.S. and EU approaches for 
those countries, but urged adoption of a strict law-and-economic version of recent 
U.S. antitrust policy as the preferred solution for each antitrust issue analyzed.  Id. 
at 570 n.76 (citing Malcolm B. Coate et al., Antitrust in Latin America: Regulating 
Government and Business, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 37 (1992)). 
22 Since the late 1990s, OECD has been particularly active in pushing for 
harmonized antitrust practices among its member countries.  AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW: COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE 
UNITED STATES, FIRST SUPPLEMENT 38 (2005).  In 1998, OECD issued a 
recommendation on hard-core cartels.  Id.  In 2001, OECD issued a report 
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efforts, it seems, is that a particular antitrust rule would function 
equally well, or at least in an acceptable manner, in different 
settings.  On the other hand, there are frequent views heeding the 
limitations of conventional antitrust law in particular settings23 and 
the need for antitrust to adapt to local circumstances.24
The efforts to create a formal antitrust law in the mold of 
Western antitrust models in China face particular challenges.  As 
Professor John Haley succinctly summarized back in 2004, the 
antitrust models that originated in the United States and Europe 
“were designed to deal with problems in advanced capitalist states 
in which the influence of private actors in national and 
international markets often seemed to outmatch the role of the 
state.”
 
25  None of these models, Professor Haley continued, “were 
concerned with state power or the need of the state to create 
conditions for effective market competition.”26  Because they “do 
not adequately address the basic underpinnings of monopoly 
power and barriers to free and competitive markets in East Asia or 
in most other developing states,”27 Professor Haley predicted that 
questions might be raised “whether these models have any 
applicability to China and other parts of East Asia.”28
Has Professor Haley been proven correct?  With the benefit of 
knowing what transpired in the first two years of the AML, this 
Article sets out to answer this question by examining the 
compatibility of Western antitrust models as incorporated in the 
AML with China’s local conditions.  In particular, it discusses three 
forces that shape competition law and policy in China:  China’s 
 
 
proposing a framework for harmonized merger control procedures.  Id.  Launched 
in October 2001, the ICN aims to “develop guiding principles and best practice 
recommendations that . . . could be implemented voluntarily by member 
agencies.”  Id. at 40.  In 2002, the ICN adopted eight recommended principles for 
merger notification and review.  See id. at 41 (listing the Guiding Principles for 
Merger Notification and Review). 
23 See, e.g., MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 
(2003) (arguing that optimal antitrust policy depends on the size of an economy); 
John O. Haley, Competition Policy for East Asia, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
277 (2004) (arguing that American and European competition law models may not 
be applicable to China and East Asia). 
24 See generally Waller, supra note 21 (discussing the transferability of national 
law). 
25 Haley, supra note 23, at 277. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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current transitional stage, China’s market structures, and pervasive 
state control in China’s economy.  Furthermore, it explains how 
these forces, all brought about by the extensive role of the state, 
have limited the applicability of Western antitrust models to China 
in three major areas of antitrust: cartels, abuse of dominant market 
position, and merger review.  Specifically, this Article analyzes 
how these forces have prevented China from pursuing a rigorous 
anti-cartel policy, how they have led to a mismatch between 
monopoly abuses that are prohibited under the AML and 
monopoly abuses that are most prevalent in China’s economy, and 
how they have prevented the merger review process under the 
AML from being meaningfully applied to domestic firms.  It 
concludes that despite having a Western-style antitrust law, China 
has not developed and likely will not develop a Western-style 
antitrust jurisprudence in the near future due to these local 
conditions.  Finally, it discusses how China developed a consensus 
on the need for a formal antitrust law despite local conditions that 
were not entirely compatible with such a law.  
This Article makes three contributions to the antitrust and legal 
transplants literature.  First, this Article studies China’s 
competition law and policy by going beyond the text of the AML 
and focusing instead on the broader contexts in which the AML 
operates.  This contextual approach illuminates China’s 
competition law and policy, particularly its ambiguities and 
inconsistencies, in a way that is impossible under a purely textual 
approach.  Second, this Article analyzes the assumptions and 
presuppositions of Western antitrust models, and discusses the 
conceptual challenges Western antitrust models encounter in 
settings in which those assumptions and presuppositions fail to 
hold.  These inquiries are of far-reaching significance in an era 
where unprecedented government intervention in the world 
markets in the wake of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis is 
threatening to alter the economic models in which antitrust law has 
traditionally operated.  Third, this Article tells a cautionary tale for 
legal transplants in general and transplants of antitrust law in 
particular, a tale that need be kept in mind in future transplant 
efforts. 
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2. SETTING THE STAGE:  ECONOMIC TRANSITION, MARKET 
STRUCTURE, AND STATE CONTROL IN CHINA 
Few would doubt that China did not need an antitrust law 
under Mao.  And few would doubt that China today is much 
different from the one under Mao.  But how did China get from 
where it was under Mao to where it is today?  Understanding 
China’s path of transition towards a market economy is of utmost 
importance to understanding the economic conditions under 
which China’s antitrust regime is being established.  The following 
discussions provide overviews of certain key aspects of China’s 
transition that have shaped its current economic conditions 
pertaining to antitrust. 
2.1. Price Liberalization 
The chief mechanism through which a market economy 
allocates resources is price.  In a command economy, however, 
price is determined by administrative fiats, not by the interaction 
of market supply and demand.  Prior to the launching of economic 
reforms in 1978, China’s economy was a typical command one.  “In 
1978, [ninety-seven] percent of domestic retail goods and [ninety-
three] percent of farm produce was subject to fixed prices.”29  In 
many cases, prices were set in accordance with the government’s 
artificial preferences for certain sectors or population groups, 
resulting in serious distortions in the economy.30
Beginning in the early 1980s, China gradually moved away 
from price controls in efforts to expand the role of markets in 
determining prices.  Initially, price reforms took the form of 
administratively readjusting the relative prices of key sectors and 
product groups to address structural distortions.
 
31
 
29 WORLD BANK, CHINA: INTERNAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION 20 
(1994) [hereinafter INTERNAL MARKET]. 
  Then the 
30 For example, prior to 1978, prices of agricultural products, raw materials, 
and light-industry products were set artificially low in order to support the 
development of heavy industry.  JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & CLAUDIA SENIK-
LEYGONIE, PRICE CONTROLS AND THE ECONOMICS OF INSTITUTIONS IN CHINA 18 (1997).  
Another example of price distortions in the command economy era is that the 
producer prices of many goods were higher than their retail prices.  Id.  This was 
intended to protect the profitability of the producers, while preserving the ability 
of the population to purchase basic consumer goods.  Id. 
31 Between 1979 and 1984, the prices of the main agricultural products were 
adjusted upwards six times, resulting in a twenty percent price increase for 
products under compulsory delivery quotas and a fifty percent price increase for 
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government began gradually introducing market forces into the 
price formation process, starting with the introduction into many 
sectors of the so-called “dual pricing system,” under which firms 
were allowed to sell their production volumes in excess of 
government-set targets at market prices.32  First introduced in the 
petroleum sector in 1981, the dual pricing system had been 
extended to all sectors of the economy by the end of 1985.33  
Progressive price decontrols in the subsequent years gradually 
reduced the gaps between state-controlled and market prices.  For 
example, in 1985, the market prices of consumer goods as a whole 
were twenty-eight percent higher than state-controlled prices;34 by 
1991, this differential declined to only five percent.35
The convergence of state-controlled and market prices laid the 
foundation for a greater degree of price liberalization.  The 
watershed year for China’s price reforms came in 1992, when the 
government completely abolished price controls for the vast 
majority of products in certain key sectors such as raw materials, 
transportation, agricultural, food, and light industry goods.
 
36  In 
1993 and 1994, price liberalization was also accomplished for steel, 
the majority of machinery products, onshore crude oil, and coal.37
 
products under voluntary deliveries.  Id.  Raw materials such as coal, iron and 
steel also increased significantly in price.  Id. at 18–19.  
  
32 Note that selling products outside of the government’s plan, though illegal, 
was already taking place in the planned economy era.  In 1975, “for consumer 
goods as a whole, free market prices were [eighty] percent above state prices.”  
INTERNAL MARKET, supra note 29, at 22.  
33 Laffont & Senik-Leygonie note: 
[t]he 1984–88 period was marked by major liberalisation and saw the 
appearance of a dual pricing system.  The latter was introduced in 1981, 
when the oil companies were authorized to sell their surplus production, 
after fulfillment of the plan quotas, at market prices. . . . By the end of 
1985, the dual pricing system had been extended to all sectors of the 
economy. 
LAFFONT & SENIK-LEYGONIE, supra note 30, at 19. 
34 INTERNAL MARKET, supra note 29, at 22. 
35 Id. 
36 Among 737 raw materials and transportation prices that were controlled 
by the central government at the end of 1991, 648 were fully liberalized in 1992.  
The year of 1992 also saw liberalization of fifty out of sixty agricultural prices and 
of all consumer goods prices except those of salt and certain medicines.  By the 
end of 1992, food prices in 844 counties and cities were also liberalized.  See Yang 
Jisheng, Jiage Gaige: Jingji Gaige Zhong de Yibu Xianqi [Price Reform: A Risky Move in 
Economic Reforms], YANHUANG CHUNQIU [YANHUANG HIST. REV.], Mar. 2009, at 18, 
22. 
37 Id. 
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Official statistics indicates that by the end of 2005, the percentage 
of market-determined prices in China had reached well over ninety 
percent.38
Despite the overall success of price reforms, price controls still 
play a significant role in certain sectors in China.  The Price Law 
enacted in 1997 explicitly allows the government to control prices 
in certain important sectors, including natural resources, sectors 
characterized by natural monopolies, and public utilities.
 
39  In 
those sectors the government could either directly set prices,40 or 
set “guidance prices” that limit the fluctuation of market prices 
within a specified band.41  In 2001, thirteen items appeared on the 
catalog of products or services whose prices were controlled by the 
central government.42
 
38 The percentage of market-determined prices was 95.6% as measured by 
consumption goods retail sales amounts, 91.9% as measured by raw materials 
sales amounts, and 97.7% as measured by agricultural procurement amounts.  
Woguo Jiage Shichanghua Chengdu Tigao [Percentage of Market-Determined Prices 
Increases in China], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECURITIES DAILY], Nov. 
18, 2006, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-11/18/content 
_5345664.htm. 
  While the number of controlled prices 
seems small, the significance of price control in China nowadays is 
definitely greater than that number would suggest, given that 
many of the controlled prices are for important products or 
services such as electricity, basic telecommunications, and gasoline. 
39 See Jiage Fa [Price Law] art. 18 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1997, effective May 1, 1999), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-09/12/content_69757.htm [hereinafter Price 
Law] (setting forth the Chinese government’s ability to set prices). 
40 See id. art. 3, cl. 5 (“Government-set prices refer to prices set by the 
government’s price regulators or other regulatory agencies within the scope of 
their pricing power, as permitted by this law.”).  
41 See id. art. 3, cl. 4 (“Government-guidance prices refer to benchmark prices 
as well as fluctuation bands set by the government’s price regulators or other 
regulatory agencies for purposes of guiding market prices, as permitted by this 
law.”). 
42 The thirteen items were: strategic food and oil reserves, tobacco, salt, 
explosives for civilian uses, some fertilizers, some important medicines, textbooks, 
natural gas, water supplied by central government or inter-provincial water 
projects, electricity, military products, important transportation services, postal 
services, basic telecommunication services, and important professional services.  
Guojia Jiwei he Guowuyuan Youguan Bumen Dingjia Mulu [Catalog of Prices 
Controlled by the National Development & Planning Commission and Other 
Central Government Agencies], Jul. 4, 2001, available at http://www.sjzwj.gov.cn 
/art/2004/09/28/art_14038_103873.html.  
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2.2. Decentralization 
Upon the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 
China adopted the economic model of the former Soviet Union, 
characterized by state ownership, central planning, and a 
development strategy heavily focused on industrialization.43  But 
unlike the former Soviet Union, where much of the production and 
distribution was directly controlled by the central government, 
China structured its industries in a much more decentralized 
fashion.44  Consequently, each region in China is relatively self-
sufficient and regional governments assume considerable 
responsibility for coordinating production and distribution within 
the region, giving rise to what economists call a multilayer, 
multiregional form (or “M-form”) of industrial structure.45
 
43 See Dwight H. Perkins, China’s Economic Policy and Performance, in 15 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA: THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, PART 2: REVOLUTIONS 
WITHIN THE CHINESE REVOLUTION, 1966–1982, at 475 (Roderick MacFarquhar & 
John K. Fairbank eds., 1991) (discussing the development of China’s economic 
policies). 
  As a 
result of China’s decentralized industrial structure, by the time 
China launched economic reforms in the late 1970s, the extent of 
44 See YINGYI QIAN & BARRY R. WEINGAST, CHINA’S TRANSITION TO MARKETS: 
MARKET-PRESERVING FEDERALISM, CHINESE STYLE 10–21 (1995) (explaining the 
historical process of decentralization in China and the current marketization as a 
result of decentralization); see also Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, Why China’s 
Economic Reforms Differ: The M-Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion of the Non-State 
Sector, 1 ECON. TRANSITION 135, 142–43 (1993) (discussing China’s M-form 
hierarchy and its contribution to China’s economic successes); Barry R. Weingast, 
The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic 
Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 21–24 (1995) (analyzing the factors 
surrounding economic growth in China).  See generally Gabriella Montinola et al., 
Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD 
POL. 50 (1995) (discussing how China implemented successful economic reforms).  
45 See Qian & Xu, supra note 44, at 144–45 (discussing historical political 
reasons behind the evolution of China’s M-form hierarchical structure).  The term 
“M-form” was first used by economists to describe the organization form of 
multi-divisional firms organized by product, technology, or geography.  See 
generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962) (examining the prevalence of the 
“multidivisional” structure in the context of companies such as Sears, Roebuck 
and Company and General Motors Corporation); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS 
AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 132–54 (1975) 
(discussing use of the multidivisional structure to achieve optimal 
divisionalization and examining the “M-form hypothesis”).  
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central planning was much smaller in China than in the former 
Soviet Union.46
Economic reforms since the late 1970s have further 
strengthened the trend towards decentralization.
 
47  One of the 
most far-reaching reform measures introduced during the reform 
era is the reform of the fiscal relationship between the central and 
local governments.48  Prior to 1980, China had a highly centralized 
fiscal regime despite its decentralized industrial structure.49  The 
Ministry of Finance of the central government set annual revenue 
and expenditure plans at the provincial level in a consolidated 
budgetary process.50  Although local governments were 
responsible for collecting all revenues and were allowed to retain 
the bulk of revenues collected, they had little discretion over the 
use of revenues.51
 
46 The number of products directly under central planning in China in 1979 
was “only 791 . . . as compared to more than twelve million in the former Soviet 
Union in the late 1970s.”  Qian & Xu, supra note 44, at 144 (citations omitted). 
  Starting in 1980, fiscal reforms granted local 
governments greater shares of revenues generated by local 
enterprises, and granted more autonomy to local governments in 
47 See id. at 145–47 (discussing how the reform policy of decentralization was 
effectuated).  
48 China’s government hierarchy consists of five levels.  Below the central 
government, there are four levels of local government:  
(1) thirty-one provincial-level governments, including twenty-two 
provinces, four municipalities with significant independent power 
directly under the central government, and five autonomous regions; (2) 
over three hundred and thirty-five prefectures and cities at the prefecture 
level; (3) over two thousand, one hundred and forty-two counties, 
autonomous counties and cities at the county level; (4) about forty-eight 
thousand towns, townships and city districts. 
See OECD, CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE DOMESTIC POLICY CHALLENGES 659–
60 (Charles A. Pigott ed., 2002).  Unless otherwise noted, the phrase “local 
governments” in this Article refers to all levels of government below the central 
level.  
49 See Christine P. W. Wong, Fiscal Reform and Local Industrialization: The 
Problematic Sequencing of Reform in Post-Mao China, 18 MOD. CHINA 197, 205 (1992) 
(stating that the budgetary process was centralized during the Maoist period). 
50 See id. (explaining the budget and revenue transfer policies of the Ministry 
of Finance). 
51 Fiscal reforms during the 1960s and 1970s provided discretionary funds for 
local use under the category of “extrabudgetary revenues” (yusuanwai zijin).  But 
the amount of the discretionary funds was small, amounting to only 2% of 
collections in rich provinces and no more than five percent in most provinces.  Id. 
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setting budgets and deciding on expenditures.52  The direct 
outcome of the fiscal reforms was that the local government 
budgets became highly dependent on the financial health of local 
enterprises.53  Coupled with the further decentralization of the 
investment control regime in the reform era,54 the fiscal reforms 
created enormous incentives, as well as pressures, for local 
governments to seek more revenues through the creation of new 
local enterprises.55
2.3. Market Concentration 
 
Although decentralization has been credited with creating the 
conditions for China’s economic success since the late 1970s,56 it 
also led to some less than desirable outcomes, one of which is the 
lack of regional specialization in China.  Unlike the former Soviet 
Union, where numerous products were produced by single 
enterprises,57
 
52 See generally OECD, supra note 48, at 659–77 (examining the current system 
of “central-local government fiscal relations” and discussing problems 
encountered within this framework); Jiwei Lou, The Reform of Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Relations in China: Lessons Learned, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN CHINA: REFORM AND 
GROWTH FOR A HARMONIOUS SOCIETY 155 (Jiwei Lou & Shuilin Wang eds., 2008) 
(discussing China’s fiscal reforms and their implications for the relationships 
between the central and local governments).  
 China’s industries are structured in a cellular 
manner, with duplication of a single industrial pattern in each 
53 See Wong, supra note 49, at 197 (explaining the economic relationship 
between local government and local enterprises). 
54 See infra Part 3.1.2. 
55 See Jean C. Oi, Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State 
Corporatism in China, 45 WORLD POL. 99, 102 (1992) (discussing how China’s fiscal 
reforms encouraged local economic development); Christine P. W. Wong, Central-
Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in 
Post-Mao China, 128 CHINA Q. 691, 691 (1991) (chronicling the fiscal changes in 
Post-Mao China). 
56 For an argument that China’s decentralized industrial structure provided 
flexibility and opportunities for carrying out regional experiments, which led to 
the emergence of the non-state sector without mass privatization and political 
tumult, see Qian & Xu, supra note 44, at 152–56.. 
57 In 1988, in 212 of the main 344 industrial product groups (62%) in the 
former Soviet Union, the largest single enterprise within the product group 
accounted for more than half of all the group’s output.  2 INT’L MONETARY FUND ET 
AL., A STUDY OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY 39 tbl.IV-2.6 (1991).  A World Bank study 
finds that in 1989, “of the total of 7,664 ‘product groups’ distributed by the former 
USSR Gossnab (Committee of Deliveries and Supplies) . . . 77 percent were 
produced by single enterprises.”  WORLD BANK, RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM: 
CROSSING THE THRESHOLD OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE 82 (1992).  
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province.58  A World Bank study finds that by the early 1990s the 
degree of differences in industrial structure across regions in China 
was much lower than in the United States or the European 
Community.59  And each one of the major industrial groups 
examined by the World Bank was present in virtually all provinces 
in the early 1990s.60  This pattern persisted through the 1990s.  By 
2001, twenty-three provinces manufactured washing machines, 
twenty-nine made television sets, twenty-three produced 
refrigerators, and twenty-seven assembled automobiles.61
The duplication of industries at the local level also led to loss of 
economies of scale.  Particularly, beginning in the early 1980s, fiscal 
incentives led to a boom of investment by local governments, 
resulting in a massive number of duplicate, small-scale local 
enterprises.
  
Apparently, China has not taken advantage of the opportunities 
for regional specialization that its large internal market would 
permit. 
62  Take automobile assembly plants for example:  in 
1996, China had 116 such plants, of which only eighteen were 
making more than 10,000 automobiles per year.63  While it is 
typically believed that 250,000 units is a “minimum efficient scale” 
for automobile assembly plants,64 the average output volume of 
China’s automobile assembly plants in 1998 was only 14,165 
units.65  Similar examples of low economies of scale abound in 
China’s economy.66
 
58 See Audrey Donnithorne, China’s Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends 
Since the Cultural Revolution, 52 CHINA Q. 605 (1972) (discussing the development 
and implications of China’s cellular economy).  
  
59 See INTERNAL MARKET, supra note 29, at 18–19 (comparing average 
coefficients of structural difference in different countries). 
60 See id. at 13 (stating that “each major industrial group is located in virtually 
all provinces”). 
61 MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL 
AUTOCRACY 129 (2006). 
62 See ANWAR SHAH & CHUNLI SHEN, DIFANG ZHENGFU HE DIFANG CAIZHENG 
JIANSHE [LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE] 475 (2005) (discussing 
“economic conflicts” among different regions in China). 
63 PEI, supra note 61, at 130. 
64 ERIC THUN, CHANGING LANES IN CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS, AND AUTO SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 59 (2006). 
65 YASHENG HUANG, SELLING CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE 
REFORM ERA 260 (2003). 
66 For example, in the late 1990s, there were about 6000 paper mills in China, 
with an average capacity of 4000 tons per mill, less than one tenth of the 
international average.  PEI, supra note 61, at 130.  “Of China’s 800 beer breweries, 
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The duplication of industries at the provincial level and the 
resulting low economies of scale led to generally low market 
concentration ratios in China.  Official statistics indicate that 
market concentration ratios in China have been unusually low 
when compared to both developed and developing economies.67  
Between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, the average market 
concentration ratio for the largest one hundred firms in various 
sectors hovered between ten and sixteen percent.68  In the mid-
1990s, in eighteen out of thirty-nine major sectors, the largest eight 
firms in each sector accounted for less than ten percent of the 
market share.69
2.4. Market Entry Restrictions 
 
Since the start of economic reform, China has seen a great 
expansion of private and foreign enterprises in its economy.70
 
only one-tenth reached the minimum capacity of 50,000 tons.”  Id.  China’s 
machine tool sector is also characterized by the dispersion of a large number of 
manufacturers in all but one province.  While the top five machine tool 
manufacturers account for 42% of the national production in Japan and 69% in the 
United States, in China the figure is only 20%.  See INTERNAL MARKET, supra note 
29, at 134 (”[C]lose communication  between enterprises in the same industrial 
sector could lead to more cartel-like output restriction over the longer term.”).  
  In 
67 In China, the concentration ratio of the largest four producers (“CR4”) in 
1984 was 17% for automobiles, 15% for cigarettes, 17% for plate glass, and 2% for 
cement.  PEI, supra note 61, at 258 n.148 (citing QI LÜDONG, ZHONGGUO XIANDAI 
LONGDUAN JINGJI YANJIU [ECONOMIC STUDIES ON MONOPOLIES IN CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA] 146–48 (1999)).  By contrast, in the United States, the CR4 in 1982 was 97% 
for automobiles, 90% for cigarettes, 78% for plate glass, and 31% for cement.  Id.  
In India, the CR4 in 1968 was 57% for automobiles, 64% for plate glass, and 60% 
for cement.  Id.   
68 Id. at 130.  
69 See id. (noting that Chinese researchers attribute this low concentration to 
slow technological progress within the firms).  
70 In 1997, the non-state sector’s share in China’s industrial output and 
industrial employment reached more than thirty-four percent and more than 
eighteen percent, respectively.  INT’L FIN. CORP., CHINA’S EMERGING PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISES: PROSPECTS FOR THE NEW CENTURY 16 (2000).  In 1998, the non-state 
sector’s share of GDP was approximately 33%.  Id.  Less than ten years later, in 
2005, the non-state sector’s share of GDP had almost doubled, reaching 65%.  See 
Minying jingji 2010 nian ke chuang qicheng GDP; siqi zengsu Beijing diyi [Private 
Enterprises May Account for Seventy-Percent of GDP; Beijing Ranks Top for Private 
Enterprises Growth Rate], XIN JING BAO [NEW BEIJING DAILY] (July 15, 2007), 
http://www.crifs.org.cn/crifs/html/default/_history/37213130.html (quoting 
official statistics released by All China Federation of Industry & Commerce, 
National Bureau of Statistics, and National Development and Reforms 
Commission).  
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certain sectors, however, private and foreign enterprises still face 
substantial government-imposed barriers to market entry.  In the 
case of foreign enterprises, the government periodically publishes 
a guidance catalog on the sectors and industries in which entry is 
prohibited or restricted.71  In the case of private enterprises, market 
entry restrictions are imposed mainly through stringent licensing 
and minimum capital requirements, and the sectors or industries 
that carry market entry restrictions tend not to be clearly spelled 
out.72  Government-imposed market entry restrictions have been 
cited by private enterprises in China as one of the major constraints 
on their growth.73
In recent years, China has shown willingness to lessen the 
market entry restrictions against domestic private enterprises.  In 
2005, China’s State Council issued a guidance opinion that became 
popularly known as “Thirty-Six Measures on Non-Public 
Economy” because it contained thirty-six measures aimed at 
promoting the development of the non-state economic sector.
 
74
 
71 The catalog also contains sectors and industries in which the entry of 
foreign enterprises is encouraged.  For the most recent edition (2007) of the 
guidance catalog, see NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMS COMMISSION & 
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, WAISHANG TOUZI CHANYE ZHIDAO MULU [GUIDANCE 
CATALOG ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT], available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb 
/zcfbl/2007ling/W020071107537750156652.pdf.   
  
The 2005 document stated that the government intended to relax 
the market entry restrictions currently in place against private 
enterprises in a number of sectors or industries, including public 
utilities and infrastructure, social services, financial services, 
national defense, electricity, telecommunications, railroads, 
72 In 2003, the Administrative Licensing Law (Xingzheng Xuke Fa) authorized 
the government to impose market entry restrictions in sectors or industries that 
are “directly related to public interest.”  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Xingzheng Xuke Fa [The Administrative Licensing Law of the People’s Republic of 
China], art. 12 § 2 (2003), http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-08/28 
/content_1048844.htm (outlining China’s market entry restrictions).  The law, 
however, does not define what constitutes “public interest,” and therefore the 
government still enjoys wide discretion in selecting the sectors or industries for 
which market entry restrictions are to be imposed. 
73 See GARNAUT ET AL., PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN CHINA 45 (2001) (surveying 
CEOs of Chinese firms about different types of entry barriers).   
74 See State Council, Guowuyuan Guanyu Guli Zhichi He Yindao Geti Siying 
Deng Fei Gongyouzhi Jingji Fazhan De Ruogan Yijian [State Council’s Opinions on 
encouraging, supporting, and guiding the development of individual, private, 
and other non-public sectors], State Council Doc. No. [2005] 3 (Feb. 19, 2005), 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-08/12/content_21691.htm (outlining China’s 
measures to develop the non-state economic sector).  
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airlines, and petroleum.75  In an effort to reduce the level of 
uncertainty surrounding market entry by private enterprises, the 
2005 document also ordered central government agencies and local 
governments to reduce various market entry restrictions against 
private enterprises to explicit legal rules.  Further, it stipulated that 
market entry would be permitted in sectors or industries where the 
law does not explicitly prohibit entry.76
However, efforts to open up State-Owned Enterprise (“SOE”)-
dominated sectors to private enterprises since 2005 have generally 
fallen short.  The quick rise and, subsequently, quick fall, of 
China’s private airline companies provides a good example of the 
failed efforts.  Shortly after the issuance of the Thirty-Six Measures 
on Non-Public Economy in 2005, the government approved more 
than twenty privately owned airline companies, and six began 
operating.
 
77  But the private airline companies quickly discovered 
that sectoral barriers in China meant more than entry prohibition, 
as discrimination in route allocations78 and government subsidies 
to SOE airlines79
 
75 Id.  
 made it very difficult for private airline 
76 Id.  
77 The six private airline companies that came into operation were: Aokai, 
Chunqiu, Yinglian, Dongxing, Jixiang, and Kunpeng.  See Jinling Li, Guohang 
Minqi Ming Zhe “Qianguize:” Baiju Beihou De Zhidu Jiban [Private Airline Companies 
Destroyed by Hidden Rules: Systemic Hurdles Behind Failures], PEOPLE’S NETWORK 
(Jul. 8, 2010), http://caac.people.com.cn/GB/114104/12089179.html (discussing 
the problems private airlines face and providing possible solutions to them); 
Xiaohong Cui, Minying Hangkong: You Chi Nan Fei [Limited by Scarce Routes, Private 
Airlines Forced to Focus on Second-Tier Cities], AIR NEWS (Dec. 26, 2006), 
http://www.airnews.cn/hotel/23228.shtml. 
78 The allocation of air routes in China heavily favors state-owned airlines, 
which are allocated most of the routes to and from China’s largest cities, such as 
Beijing and Shanghai.  Private airlines have to focus on second-tier cities, such as 
Harbin, Haikou, Sanya, Hangzhou, and Kunming.  Chunqiu Airline, whose main 
hub is in Shanghai, was forced to reassign its airplanes to Hainan province 
because it was unable to obtain more routes in Shanghai.  See Hangban Shike 
Shouxian; Minying Hangkong Bei Tuiju “Erxian” [Limited By Scarce Routes, Private 
Airlines Forced to Focus on Second-Tier Cities], AIR NEWS (Dec. 26, 2006), 
http://airnews.cn/consultation/23228.shtml.  
79 For example, the 2008–2009 global financial crisis and plummeting crude 
oil prices led to huge losses on the fuel hedging contracts entered into by China’s 
major state-owned airlines.  The losses on fuel hedging contracts at Air China, 
China’s largest airline, reached ¥6.8 billion in 2008, almost eclipsing its profits in 
2006 and 2007 combined.  Guohang Taobao Kui 68 Yi Chaoguo Donghang; Shue Jiejin 
Liangnian Yingli Zonghe [Air China’s Loss on Fuel Hedging Contracts Larger Than 
Eastern Airline’s; ¥6.8 Billion Loss Almost Eclipses Two Years’ Profits], SOHU, Jan. 19, 
2009, http://news.sohu.com/20090119/n261823132.shtml.  In response, the 
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companies to compete.  Within a short period, most of the private 
airline companies that came into operation were either liquidated 
or acquired by SOE airline companies, or found themselves in 
serious financial troubles.80  In May 2010, the State Council made 
new efforts to relax market entry restrictions against private 
enterprises by issuing another guidance opinion known as “New 
Thirty-Six Measures on Non-Public Economy.”81
2.5. The Transformation of State Owned Enterprises 
  But whether the 
new guidance opinion will achieve what the 2005 guidance 
opinion failed to achieve remains to be seen. 
In the official lexicon of the Chinese political economy, “State-
Owned Enterprises” refer to enterprises owned by the “whole 
people” whose ownership rights are exercised by governments at 
various levels, from the central government down to county 
governments.82  During the planned economy era, SOEs were little 
more than productive units of the state:  managers (or, more 
accurately, government officials) at SOEs simply followed 
government orders regarding what to produce, how much to 
produce, and the prices at which the products would be sold, and 
then turned all resulting profits (or losses) over to the 
government.83
The reform of China’s SOEs during the reform era proceeded 
along three lines:  commercialization, corporatization, and 
consolidation.  Initially, between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, 
 
 
government injected huge amounts of equity into major state-owned airlines.  See 
Dongfang Hangkong Huode 30 Yi Yuan Zhengfu Zhuzi [Eastern Airline to Receive ¥3 
Billion Equity Injection from the Government], XINHUA FINANCE (Dec. 11, 2008), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-12/11/content_10486200.htm (noting 
that the government hopes to ease the working capital pressures of the airline 
with the investment). 
80 See Li, supra note 77 (providing examples of airlines that were either 
liquidated or merged with another airline).  
81 See State Council, Guowuyuan Guanyu Guli He Yindao Minjian Touzi Jiankang 
Fazhan De Ruogan Yijian [State Council Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding the 
Health Development of Private Investment], State Council Doc. No. [2010] 13 
(May 13, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-05/13/content_1605218.htm 
(outlining ways of encouraging private investment in China).  
82 See Qian & Xu, supra note 44, at 138 (defining SOEs); see also OECD, supra 
note 48, at 659–60 (describing China’s fiscal structure). 
83 See generally Lixin Colin Xu, Control, Incentives, and Competition: The Impact 
of Reform on Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, 8 ECON. TRANSITION 151 (2000) 
(discussing how various reforms benefitted China’s SOEs). 
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China’s SOE strategy focused on managing SOEs more like 
commercial entities without altering the SOEs’ governance 
structures.  In connection with the price reforms discussed above, 
the government delegated to SOEs the power to make managerial 
decisions on a variety of issues, including choice of products, 
production volumes, pricing, technology adoption, production 
scheduling, exports, and employee wages.84  The government also 
allowed SOEs to retain a portion of profits through the use of a 
profit contract system.85  The commercialization of SOEs without 
governance reforms, however, failed to revitalize the stagnant SOE 
sector.  Between 1980 and 1992, although the gross output of SOEs 
more than quadrupled, SOE losses increased more than tenfold.86
Beginning with the enactment of the Company Law in 1993,
  
87 
China started experimenting with “corporatizing” SOEs, i.e., 
converting SOEs into corporations.  Under the Company Law, 
SOEs can be converted to “wholly state-owned companies”88 
where the state owns all stakes, or “limited liability companies”89 
and “joint stock limited companies”90 where the state owns partial 
stakes.   SOEs converted to joint stock limited companies can be 
listed on China’s stock markets if listing requirements are met.91
 
84 Id. at 154–55. 
  
85 Between 1981 and 1983, the government introduced different versions of 
profit contracting among SOEs.  However, the SOEs responded by demanding a 
larger share of profits, while still insisting that any losses remain with the state.  
This resulted in shrinking state revenues.  In 1983, the government introduced a 
tax-for-profit system, substituting income taxes for remission of profits.  But the 
tax-for-profit system only prompted SOEs to bargain for lower tax rates.  In 1986, 
the government returned to the profit contact system.  See SHU-YUN MA, 
SHAREHOLDING SYSTEM REFORM IN CHINA: PRIVATIZING BY GROPING FOR STONES 9 
(2010); see also Xu, supra note 83, at 154 (”The average marginal retention rate [of 
SOEs] rose from 11 per cent in 1980 to 17 per cent in 1984, ending up at 25 per cent 
in 1989.”). 
86 MA, supra note 85, at 9–10.  
87 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa [Company Law of the People’s Republic 
of China] (promulgated by the Tenth Standing Comm. Nat’l People's Cong., Dec. 
29, 1993, effective Jan. 1, 2006), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-10/28/content 
_85478.htm [hereinafter “Company Law”].   
88 See id. arts. 65–71 (listing special provisions relating to wholly state-owned 
companies).  
89 Id. art. 23 (stating the conditions limited liability companies must satisfy).  
90 Id. art. 77 (stating conditions joint stock limited companies must satisfy).  
91 Initially, only subsidiaries of large SOEs were listed on the stock markets, 
and only a portion of the shares of the listed companies were tradable.  Usually, a 
wholly state-owned SOE would spin off some assets into a subsidiary, sell a 
portion (typically one-third) of the shares of the subsidiary to institutional and 
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Corporatized SOEs are required by the Company Law to improve 
their internal governance mechanisms by establishing boards of 
directors, boards of supervisors, and shareholders’ general 
meetings.92
In addition to commercialization and corporatization, another 
important component of China’s SOE reforms is consolidation.  
Since the early 1990s, China has embarked on a “grasp the large, 
and let go of the small” (Zhua Da Fang Xiao) strategy, under which 
the government aims to control only large-sized SOEs in strategic 
sectors, while relinquishing the control of small and medium-sized 
SOEs.
 
93  Under this strategy, many of the small and medium-sized 
SOEs were privatized,94 while large SOEs were consolidated into 
even larger SOE groups.95
 
private investors, and then apply to have the subsidiary listed on the stock 
exchanges.  This allowed the government to introduce corporate governance 
reforms without relinquishing control of SOEs.  STEPHEN GREEN, ‘TWO-THIRDS 
PRIVATIZATION’: HOW CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES ARE—FINALLY—PRIVATIZING, THE 
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BRIEFING NOTE 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Policy-Briefs/Detail/?lng=en&id 
=23024; see Chenxia Shi, Recent Ownership Reform and Control of Central State-
Owned Enterprises in China: Taking One Step at a Time, 30 U. NEW S. WALES L. J. 855, 
858 n.11 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1121255 (describing how the restructuring of the SOEs allowed them to be 
listed on the stock market). 
  In 2003, the central government created 
the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
92 See Company Law, supra note 87, art. 11 (noting that the Company Law is 
binding on company shareholders, directors, supervisors and senior managers).  
For an overview of China’s corporate governance structures under the Company 
Law, see Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 14 CHINA 
ECON. REV. 494, 494 (2003) (“A fundamental dilemma of Chinese [corporate 
governance laws and institutions] stems from the state policy of maintaining a full 
or controlling ownership interest in enterprises in several sectors.”). 
93  OECD, CHINA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: REFORMING CHINA’S ENTERPRISES 52 
(2000).  
94 See id. at 56–58 (explaining that the justification for privatizing small firms 
is “to reduce government burdens and responsibilities for public enterprises, 
while improving their capabilities to successfully compete in a market 
environment”).  Although the exact number of SOEs being privatized is not 
known, the general consensus among economists is that China’s SOE reforms did 
not result in mass privatization.  Cf. Qian & Xu, supra note 44, at 156 (noting 
methods that would accelerate China’s privatization).  This is in contrast to the 
rapid, mass privatization in Russia and Eastern European countries in the post-
communist era.  See Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate 
Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1739–40 (2000) (stating that 
privatization in Russia began in 1992 and was “largely complete” by 1994). 
95 For discussion on the rationales for the consolidation of SOEs, see infra Part 
3.3.3. 
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Commission (“SASAC”) to supervise most of the SOEs controlled 
by the central government (or “central SOEs”).96  SASAC’s stated 
goal is to reduce, through consolidation, the number of SOEs 
within its jurisdiction from 196 in 2003 to between 80 and 100 by 
the end of 2010.97  Local-level SASACs were also created and 
charged with consolidating SOEs controlled by local governments 
(“local SOEs”).98  The consolidation of SOEs, which is still going 
on, has already resulted in the formation of a group of behemoth 
SOEs.  In 2009, 331 of China’s 500 largest companies by revenues 
were SOEs.99  In 2010, thirty-eight of China’s largest SOEs 
appeared in the Fortune Global 500, with three of them appearing 
on the top ten list.100
 
96 For a complete listing of current central SOEs, see Directory of Central SOEs, 
STATE-OWNED ASSET SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
COUNCIL (“SASAC”), 
  Today, almost all of the most important 
industries in China—such as national defense, electricity, 
petroleum and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, civil 
aviation, waterway transportation, banking, and insurance—are 
dominated by SOEs.  In 2006, SOEs accounted for almost all of the 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2010).  Note that not all SOEs controlled by the central 
government are within SASAC’s jurisdiction.  For historical reasons, SASAC only 
supervises “industrial” SOEs.  The largest SOEs in the financial sector (such as the 
four state-owned commercial banks) are supervised by Central Huijin Investment 
Ltd. (zhongyang huijin touzi youxian zeren gongsi), a holding company that reports 
directly to the State Council.  
97 See Shuhong Chen Xiaohong, Jinnian di zhongyang qiye jiang jianshao dao 80-
100 hu [Number of Central SOEs to Shrink to 80-100 by End of Year], BEIJING 
QINGNIAN BAO [BEIJING YOUTH DAILY] (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.ce.cn/cysc 
/newmain/jdpd/zjxw/201004/07/t20100407_20360865.shtml (stating the total 
number of SOEs to be consolidated by the end of 2010). 
98 See Guoziwei Jiang She Xianji Guozi Jianguan Jigou; Difang Guozi Chongzu 
Jiang Ai [SASAC to Establish County-Level State Assets Management Offices; 
Consolidation of Local SOEs Imminent], MEIRI JINGJI XINWEN [DAILY ECONOMIC NEWS] 
(May 4, 2010), http://www.ce.cn/macro/more/201005/04/t20100504_21352873 
.shtml (noting the consolidation of SOEs at the county level is ongoing).  
99  See 2009 Zhongguo da Qiye Fazhan de Qushi, Wenti he Jianyi [The Development 
of China’s Large Enterprises: Trend, Problems, and Suggestions], CHINA ENTERPRISE 
CONFEDERATION & CHINA ENTERPRISE DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION, http://www.cec-
ceda.org.cn/c500/chinese/content.php?id=100&t_id=1 (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) 
(noting that the majority of the top 500 Chinese enterprises are SOEs).   
100 For a complete list of the companies comprising the Fortune Global 500, 
see Fortune, Global 500: Our Annual Ranking of the World’s Largest Corporations, 
CNN MONEY (July 26, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune 
/global500/2010/full_list/index.html.  Among the forty-two companies on the 
list from mainland China, only three are privately owned: Ping An Insurance 
(#383), Huawei Technologies (#397), and Jiangsu Shagang Group (#415).  
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production of petroleum, natural gas, and ethylene, provided all of 
the basic telecommunication services, generated approximately 
55% of electricity, and flew about 82% of passengers and cargo 
through the country’s air transportation system.101  Because of the 
dominance of large SOEs in those industries and the market entry 
restrictions against non-SOEs in those industries,102
All of these reforms notwithstanding, China’s SOEs still differ 
in material respects from profit-maximizing firms in market 
economies.  Although most SOEs now are generally responsive to 
market signals, profit maximization is not the sole objective of 
SOEs and often gives way to other objectives such as the provision 
of employment and social services and the generation of tax 
revenues.
 those 
industries are often referred to as “monopoly industries” in China 
and the SOEs in them are often referred to as “SOE monopolies.” 
103  Every SOE in China still carries a political rank, and 
many of the largest SOEs, such as the central SOEs supervised by 
SASAC, are very politically powerful.104
 
101 Tuijin Guoyou Jingji Buju Zhanlue Tiaozheng: Pochu Longduan Rengshi 
Jiaodian [Tackling SOE Monopolies Key to the Restructuring of State-Owned Sectors], 
LIAOWANG, (Dec. 13, 2006), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-12/13 
/content_5480196.htm.  Recall that most of those sectors or industries are those in 
which stringent market entry restrictions are maintained against private 
enterprises.  See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text (detailing these barriers 
to entry).  
 Finally, China’s SOEs still 
have implicit, and sometimes even explicit, financial backing from 
the government.  The “soft budget constraints” of SOEs—i.e., 
102 See supra Part 2.4. 
103 See D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1713, 1727–28 (2009) 
(noting that SOE’s are not “necessarily profit-maximizers” and that some of their 
“functions are based on non-financial goals”).  
104 Many of the central SOEs were actually created from government 
ministries.  For example, China Petrochemical Corporation (“Sinopec”) and China 
National Petroleum Corporation (“CNPC”), China’s largest two petroleum 
companies, were created in the 1980s from the downstream (refining and 
marketing) and upstream (exploration and production) assets of the then Ministry 
of Petroleum Industry.  See Erica S. Downs, Business Interest Groups in Chinese 
Politics: The Case of the Oil Companies, in CHINA’S CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: 
PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 121, 122 (Cheng Li ed., 2008).  The assignment of a 
political rank to Sinopec and CNPC caused many controversies.  The founders of 
Sinopec and CNPC wanted a ministry rank (bu) for the new companies, while the 
existing ministries were willing to assign only a general bureau (zongju, one half-
level below ministry) or bureau (ju, one level below ministry) rank.  See SUSAN L. 
SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 94 (1993) (discussing 
the importance of agencies’ official rank).  The founders of Sinopec and CNPC 
prevailed, with both companies assigned a ministry rank. 
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SOEs’ abilities to turn losses over to the government—give rise to 
the moral hazard problems typically associated with not having to 
be fully responsible for operating failures.105
2.6. The Changing Regulatory Landscape 
 
In the planned economy era, government ministries directly 
managed China’s major industries,106
China has responded by using different strategies for different 
industries.  In industries that the government believes should be 
opened up to market competition and that state capital should 
eventually exit, China has gradually reduced the role of the 
government through numerous rounds of government 
restructuring.
 obviating the need for 
government regulation as it is known in market economies.  As 
China makes its transition towards a market economy, the 
question arises as to how to redefine the nature and extent of state 
involvement in the economy. 
107  Those industries, known as “competitive 
industries” in China, generally include the coal, machinery, 
metallurgy, chemical, light, textile, building materials, and 
nonferrous metal industries.  The central government ministries 
overseeing those industries were first downgraded in 1998 before 
being abolished altogether in 2001.108
 
105 See WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON, THE FINANCIAL ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 
40 (2005) (stating that the SOEs do not bear the risk of financial collapse). 
 
106 In the planned economy era, there was a ministry within the central 
government for almost every major sector or industry, such as agriculture, coal, 
and machinery.  “The economic sectoral ministries can be thought of as divisions 
in a huge conglomerate called ‘China, Incorporated’ . . . .”  SHIRK, supra note 104, 
at 93.    
107 For a detailed discussion of China’s governmental reforms from 1978 to 
2008, see OECD, CHINA: DEFINING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE MARKET AND THE 
STATE 92–95 (2009). 
108 In the massive restructuring of the central government agencies in 1998, 
the overseeing ministries for those competitive industries were downgraded to 
“national bureaus” under the State Economic and Trade Commission.  In 2001, the 
national bureaus were abolished.  See Jingmaowei Chexiao Guojia Guonei Maoyi ju 
Deng Jiu Ge Guojia Ju [State Economic & Trade Commission Abolishes Nine National 
Bureaus Including Domestic Distribution Bureau], SINA (Feb. 19, 2001), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/37340.html.   The administrative functions of those 
national bureaus were assumed by SASAC.  See OECD, supra note 107, at 94 
(describing how the State Economic and Trade Commission’s bureaus on state 
enterprises were transferred to SASAC).  This is an implicit recognition that the 
government’s interest in those sectors is no more than its ownership interest in the 
SOEs in those sectors. 
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In industries in which the government decides to retain control 
of state capital—i.e., “monopoly industries” such as electricity, 
banking, insurance, telecommunications, petroleum, civil aviation, 
and railroads—government reforms have generally focused on 
separating the government’s role as regulator from its role as 
owner of the major enterprises.  In some of the monopoly 
industries, China established new “independent” regulatory 
bodies that assumed the regulatory functions of the government, 
including:  the China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(established in 1998), the General Administration of Civil Aviation 
(established in 2002), the State Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(established in 2003), and the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (established in 2003).109  In the petroleum industry, 
regulatory power was stripped from the SOE duopoly, China 
National Petroleum Corporation and China Petrochemical 
Corporation, and was reassigned to other government agencies.110  
In the telecommunications industry, the SOE monopoly, China 
Telecom, was separated from its affiliated ministry, the Ministry of 
Post and Telecommunication, which itself was merged with 
another government ministry to form a new—supposedly more 
independent industry regulator—the Ministry of Information 
Industry in 1998.111
 
109 OECD, supra note 107, at 94. 
  The telecommunications industry 
110 CNPC and Sinopec were granted regulatory power when they were first 
created in the 1980s.  In 2000, the regulatory and policy functions of CNPC and 
Sinopec were transferred to the State Economic and Trade Commission.  With the 
abolition of the State Economic and Trade Commission in 2003, the National 
Development and Reforms Commission assumed regulatory functions for the 
petroleum industry.  See OECD, CHINA IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: GOVERNANCE IN 
CHINA 292 (2005). 
111 Until 1994, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication (“MPT”) was 
both the regulator and the dominant operator of China’s telecommunications 
network.  Through China Telecom, the MPT provided landline, mobile, data 
transmission, and satellite services.  In 1988, three other ministries—the Ministry 
of Electronic Industry (“MEI”), the Ministry of Electric Power (“MEP”), and the 
Ministry of Railroads (“MR”)—started lobbying the State Council for a rival 
telecommunications operator.  In 1993, the State Council authorized MEI, MEP, 
and MR to form China United Telecommunications Corporation, or China 
Unicom, which came into operation in 1994.  However, MPT used its regulatory 
power to hold back the initial growth of China Unicom; it was denied entry into 
certain markets and access to China Telecom’s vast landline network.  In 1998, 
MPT was merged with MEI to form MII, and China Telecom was separated from 
the new regulator.  See PEI, supra note 61, at 103–05 (discussing the history and 
politics of the reorganization).  The reform of the regulatory structure for the 
telecommunications industry is part of the overall restructuring of the 
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subsequently underwent three more rounds of restructuring and 
one more round of regulatory reform, and now the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology—a new industry regulator 
created in 2008—oversees three telecommunications carriers.112  
The last major monopoly industry that has not undertaken 
regulatory reform is the railroad industry, where the Ministry of 
Railroads is still both the regulator and the owner of all major 
enterprises in the industry.113  However, reform of the railroad 
industry in the form of separating the government’s regulatory 
functions from its operating functions is reportedly on the agenda, 
with the Ministry of Railroads slated to be merged into the 
Ministry of Transportation by the end of 2010.114
Regulatory reforms in China, however, are by no means 
complete.  In industries where the government has abolished its 
formal regulatory roles, the informal roles of the government are 
still preserved—to varying degrees—through the so-called 
“industrial associations.”  In the wake of the government reforms 
of the 1990s, a number of industrial associations were established 
in various industries to provide industrial coordination and self-
regulation.  Many of those newly established industrial 
associations, however, are essentially quasi-governmental entities:  
they are staffed by former government officials from the industries’ 
former supervising ministries, and have the same organizational 
structures and functions as the defunct supervising ministries.  
Many of the industrial associations are officially “affiliated” 
(guakao) with various government agencies.
 
115
 
telecommunications industry.  For further discussions of the restructuring of the 
telecommunications industry, see infra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 
112 See infra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing China’s restructuring 
of its telecommunications industry after 1998). 
113 See OECD, supra note 110, at 292 (noting that the Ministry of Railway 
serves as the “owner, operator and regulator” of the railroad industry in China). 
114 Tiedaobu Gaige Xin Xinhao; Liangnian Hou Bingru Jiaotongbu [New Signals on 
Railroad Reforms; Ministry of Railroads to be Merged into Ministry of Transportation in 
Two Years], CHINAREVIEWNEWS.COM (Mar. 25, 2008), http://gb.chinareviewnews 
.com/doc/1006/0/4/2/100604265.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=100604265. 
115 For example, the industrial associations that were converted from former 
national bureaus under the State Economic and Trade Commission are now 
officially affiliated with SASAC.  Those associations include: China Iron & Steel 
Association, China Machinery Industry Federation, China Petroleum and 
Chemical Industry Federation, China Light Industry Federation, China Textile 
Industry Association, China Coal Industry Association, China Federation of 
Logistics & Purchasing, and China Non-Ferrous Metals Industry Association.  A 
number of industrial associations in the export and import sector are affiliated 
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Furthermore, in many of the industries where the government 
has retained its regulatory presence, the impartiality of the 
regulators remains questionable.  Although the original intent of 
regulatory reforms in those industries was to separate the 
government’s regulatory functions from its operating functions, 
politically powerful SOEs still regularly receive favorable 
regulatory treatment, an example of which is the preferences 
routinely given to state-owned airlines in route allocations in the 
airline industry.116  In addition, it is still not uncommon for a 
government agency to either directly own or otherwise have 
financial deals with “affiliate companies” that are subject to its 
regulation.117
2.7. Setting the Stage:  Conclusions 
  With financial interests at stake, the partiality—
rather than impartiality—of the regulators is all but assured. 
As discussed above, three decades of economic reforms have 
fundamentally transformed China.  Long gone are the days when 
the state controlled almost every aspect of China’s economy.  
China’s economic transition, however, is by no means complete.  
Despite the increasingly important role of the market, many 
aspects of China’s economy are still transitional in nature.  Most 
importantly, although most prices have been liberalized, the 
government still maintains price controls over certain key 
products.  The SOEs, although now generally responsive to market 
signals, are still not true profit-maximizing commercial entities.  In 
terms of market structure, China’s decentralized industrial 
structure prior to the start of economic reforms and the further 
 
with the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”).  Officially called “chambers of 
commerce,” those associations include China Chamber of Commerce for Import 
and Export of Textiles, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of 
Light Industrial Products and Arts-Crafts, China Chamber of Commerce of 
Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters, China Chamber of 
Commerce for Import and Export of Foodstuffs, Native Produce & Animal By-
Products, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery & 
Electronic Products, and China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of 
Medicines & Health Products.  See JIANHUA LIU, ZHONGGUO SHICHANG XIN ZHIXU 
[CHINA’S NEW MARKET ORDER] 178 & n.1 (2006). 
116 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.  
117 This stems in large part from the fact that before the enactment of the 
Company Law in 1993, China “vested the power of approving the establishment 
of companies in various functional administrative agencies.”  See Bing Song, 
Competition Policy in a Transitional Economy: The Case of China, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
387, 407 (1995). 
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decentralization of China’s industries in the reform era have led to 
generally low market concentration ratios in China.  Finally, 
China’s economy is still subject to extensive state control.  In 
addition to the government’s control over prices and SOEs, the 
government still imposes market entry restrictions against non-
SOE firms in certain important industries.  The government also 
exercises control in those industries through the regulatory 
process, which has been streamlined but still lacks the institutional 
guarantee of impartiality. 
3. THE AML AS A LEGAL TRANSPLANT 
The key elements of China’s economic conditions summarized 
in the Part 2 have a great impact on the viability of the AML as a 
legal transplant.  The act of transplanting the AML is relatively 
simple; the more challenging question is whether the transplant 
will “grow in its new body, and become part of that body just as 
the rule or institution would have continued to develop in its 
parent system.”118
3.1. Cartels, Chinese Style 
  In order for a legal transplant to be successful, 
the local conditions of the host country should not reject the 
transplant or render the transplant irrelevant.  The discussion 
below will explore how China’s local conditions have affected the 
effectiveness and relevance of the Western antitrust models as 
incorporated in the AML.  It demonstrates that in all three major 
areas of antitrust—cartels, abuse of dominant market position, and 
merger review—China’s local conditions have prevented the AML 
from becoming an integral part of China’s competition policy. 
One of the central goals of antitrust is to maintain a competitive 
market through which society’s economic resources are allocated 
among competing uses.  In a perfectly competitive market, firms 
make production and sale decisions independently of—and in 
competition with—one another, driving prices down and volumes 
of production up to socially optimal levels.  However, if 
competitors could reach, and enforce, an agreement among 
themselves—i.e., form a “cartel”—regarding certain areas of 
competition such as price, the resulting constraints on competition 
will disrupt market discipline and cause losses to consumer and 
 
118 WATSON, supra note 1, at 27.  
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social welfare.119  Due to the perceived threat of cartels to the 
functioning of the market mechanism that is considered so 
essential to resource allocation, antitrust law in most countries is 
particularly harsh on cartels, subjecting many of them to a per se 
illegality standard.120
Cartels, however, have not always been treated consistently 
under antitrust law.  Despite the generally rigorous antitrust 
enforcement against cartels in Western countries, cartels have 
historically been tolerated or even actively encouraged by 
governments during times of depressed business conditions as a 
means of dealing with excess capacity and falling prices.
 
121
 
119 Adam Smith, who first articulated the laissez-faire economic theory, 
characterized cartels as “a conspiracy against the public.”  See ADAM SMITH, AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 84 (Jonathan 
Wright ed., 2007) (“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for 
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”).  But see Jeffrey Fear, Cartels, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS HISTORY 268 (Geoffrey Jones & Jonathan 
Zeitlin eds., 2007) for an alternative characterization of cartels.  Under Fear’s 
characterization, cartels historically provided participating firms with a range of 
market-ordering options and were not formed to eliminate competition, but to 
regulate competition.  Id. at 269.  
  As it 
120 In the United States, for example, cartels (or “horizontal constraints”) are 
condemned under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.  Agreements by rival firms to fix prices, a core element of cartel 
conduct, have received high levels of scrutiny from the courts.  In United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the U.S. Supreme Court declared that price-fixing 
agreements violated the Sherman Act regardless of the reasonableness of the price 
fixed and regardless of whether the conspirators possessed the power to affect 
prices in the market.  See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 
223 (1940) (“Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and 
with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a 
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.”).  In modern times 
U.S. antitrust jurisprudence has moved away from this “per se rule” in the 
horizontal constraints area in favor of a truncated “rule of reason” analysis.  See 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979) 
(“Not all arrangements among actual or potential competitors that have an impact 
on price are per se violations of the Sherman Act.”).  However, courts still apply 
the classic per se rule to the most egregious forms of price fixing.  See, e.g., FTC v. 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) (“The per se rules also 
reflect a longstanding judgment that the prohibited practices by their nature have 
a substantial potential for impact on competition.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
121 In the United States, for example, the National Industry Recovery Act 
(“NIRA”) was enacted in 1933 as a response to the Great Depression.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 703 (2006) (allowing the President to approve “codes of fair competition” 
for various trades and industries.).  The NIRA “authorized trade associations or 
industrial groups to establish codes of fair conduct, subject to the approval of the 
president.”  MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 83 (2d ed. 
2000).  Failures to adopt codes of fair conduct “could result in the imposition of 
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stands now, antitrust law appears to have developed different 
approaches to cartels during times of excess capacity, depending 
on the nature of the excess capacity to which cartels are intended as 
a response.  If the excess capacity is the result of sluggish market 
demand during a business cycle downturn, antitrust law—
primarily that of the United States—has, after some periods of 
wavering, come to the conclusion that cartels should not be 
condoned under such conditions, even if the downturn is a very 
severe one.122  From a normative point of view, this refusal to allow 
cartels during business cycle downturns is arguably defensible, as 
business cycle downturns do not typically involve the malfunction 
of the market mechanism itself, and reduced profits or losses 
incurred in such downturns are likely to be offset by profits 
enjoyed in business cycle upswings.123
 
codes by the president or direct [government] regulation.”  Id.  The codes were 
exempt from antitrust law, and, as a result, agreements to fix prices were allowed.  
Id.  The U.S. Supreme Court struck down part of the NIRA that permitted cartels 
in 1935 on grounds unrelated to antitrust.  See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (noting that the U.S. Constitution did not provide 
authority to “destroy the distinction . . . between commerce ‘among the several 
States’ and the internal concerns of a State”). 
 
122 The U.S. Supreme Court declared in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., a case concerning the depressed oil refining industry during the Great 
Depression, that an industry crisis was not relevant to antitrust analysis and that 
cartels could not be justified on the ground that they diminished “competitive 
evils.”  Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 221.  The Supreme Court’s holding in Socony-
Vacuum was in stark contrast to its holding seven years earlier in Appalachian Coal, 
where it validated concerted industry action in the similarly depressed coal 
mining industry during the Great Depression.  See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. 
United States, 288 U.S. 344, 377 (1933) (“[T]he question under the Act is not simply 
whether the parties have restrained competition between themselves but as to the 
nature and effect of that restraint.”).  In Japan, between 1953 and 1999, Section 24–
3 of the Antimonopoly Law explicitly allowed the so-called “depression cartels” 
or “recession cartels” to fix prices in the event of imminent bankruptcy of firms in 
an industry.  DAVID FLATH, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 205 (2d ed. 2005).  Section 24-3 
of the Antimonopoly Law was widely used in the 1950s and 1960s, and the 
“number of government-sanctioned cartels peaked at 1,079 in 1971.”  But “[s]ince 
that time the number [of government-sanctioned cartels] has steadily declined, 
dipping only to twelve by 1997.”  EDWARD J. LINCOLN, ARTHRITIC JAPAN: THE SLOW 
PACE OF ECONOMIC REFORM 34 (2001).  Section 24–3 of the Antimonopoly Law was 
eventually repealed in 1999.  Catherine M. Bejerana, Capitalist Manifesto: The 
Inadequacy of Antitrust Laws in Preventing the Cannibalism of Competition, 2 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 143, 159 n.103 (2001). 
123 See MANFRED NEUMANN, COMPETITION POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 103 (2001) (“Cartels are frequently defended as being indispensable for 
coping with declining demand.”).  
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Where, however, the excess capacity is the result of a structural 
crisis—i.e., a crisis stemming from structural problems in the 
economy that prevent the “creative destruction,” to use 
Schumpeter’s term,124 of the excess capacity through the market 
mechanism, antitrust law—primarily that of the European Union— 
has been more sympathetic to the needs for government-
sanctioned cartels as part of non-market solutions to the excess 
capacity.  The best examples of such “structural crisis cartels” are 
perhaps the cartels organized in the European synthetic fiber and 
steel industries in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In both cases, the 
industry crisis in question was first triggered by a business cycle 
downturn, but structural problems, caused largely by distortive 
state aid provided by member states of the European Communities 
as part of their national industrial policy, prevented the 
elimination of the excess capacity through the market 
mechanism.125
The fundamental challenge China faces in devising a coherent 
cartel policy is that the structural problems that once beset the 
European synthetic fiber and steel industries are present in the 
  From a normative point of view, this 
accommodation of cartels is arguably justifiable because the 
prevailing market conditions in a structural crisis are typically 
distorted by government intervention and do not necessarily 
reflect optimal resource allocations in the first place.  The 
normative case for rigorous antitrust enforcement against cartels, 
therefore, is much weakened under such conditions. 
 
124 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d 
ed. 1950) (“Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.  It is what 
capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in.”).  
125 In the European synthetic fiber industry, the 1973 oil crisis and the 
ensuing global recession caused demand to slow down significantly around 1973, 
but capacity continued to expand until 1978, as some member countries of the 
European Communities continued granting state aid to national firms in order to 
preserve existing capacity and develop new capacity.  This aid prolonged huge 
losses to the industry.  In 1978, the European Commission approved the 
D’Avignon Agreement, a cartel agreement in essence, signed by eleven major 
producers of European synthetic fiber for purposes of reducing their combined 
capacity for the main fiber types.  See P. Simpson, Response to Decline in the Western 
European Synthetic Fibre Industry: An Investigation of a Crisis Cartel, in HOW CARTELS 
ENDURE AND HOW THEY FAIL: STUDIES OF INDUSTRIAL COLLUSION 254, 258 (Peter Z. 
Grossman ed., 2004) (noting that the D’Avignon Agreement was an effort to 
decrease capacity).  Similarly, structural crisis cartels were permitted in the 
European steel industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a response to 
excessive capacities caused by distortive state aid given by member states of the 
European Communities to national steel firms.  NEUMANN, supra note 123, at 103.  
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Chinese economy on a more massive scale.  As discussed below, in 
many—if not most—of China’s industries, structural problems 
caused by the government’s distortive roles in both capacity 
formation and capacity elimination have led to chronic excess 
capacity.  The tremendous competitive pressures resulting from 
excess capacity in those industries have, in turn, largely tied 
China’s hands in formulating its cartel policy. 
3.1.1. China’s Excess Capacity Problem 
By all indications, China’s economy has evolved from its 
socialist past where chronic shortage of products and services was 
the norm.126  In many of China’s industries, chronic excess 
capacity, rather than shortage, has become the defining feature.  In 
the mid 1990s, there was excess capacity in sixty-one of China’s 
ninety-four major categories of industrial products and the 
capacity utilization rate was below fifty percent in thirty-five of 
them.127  The capacity utilization rate, for example, was seventy 
percent in the textile and oil refining industries, sixty percent in the 
machine tool, copper processing, tobacco, and alcohol spirits 
industries, and thirty to fifty percent in the home appliances 
industry.128
The excess capacity in many of China’s industries has persisted 
through today, and in some industries, the amount of excess 
capacity has reached staggering levels.  In September 2009, China’s 
State Council approved and circulated a document drafted by the 
National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) and 
nine other ministries on excess capacity in a number of 
industries.
 
129
 
126 The Hungarian economist Janos Kornai characterizes the typical centrally 
planned economy as a “shortage economy.”  According to Kornai, the chronic 
shortages throughout Eastern Europe in the late 1970s were not the result of 
planners’ errors, but systemic flaws in the socialist system.  See generally JÁNOS 
KORNAI, ECONOMICS OF SHORTAGE (D. W. Jorgenson & J. Waelbroeck eds., 1980). 
  According to the NDRC document, the capacity 
127 PEI, supra note 61, at 129.  
128 Id.  
129 The ministries involved in the drafting were: National Development and 
Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry 
of Supervision, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Land and Resources, Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, People’s Bank of China, General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine, China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, and China Securities Regulatory Commission.  Guanyu Yizhi Bufen 
Hangye Channeng Guosheng he Chongfu Jianshe yindao Chanye Jiankang Fazhan de 
Ruogan Yijian [Notice on Opinions Concerning Inhibiting Excess Capacity and 
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utilization rate in 2008 was only 76% for steel, 75% for cement, 73% 
for aluminum electrode, 88% for flat glass, 40% for methanol, and 
20% for poly-crystalline silicon (a key raw material for solar 
cells).130  If the new capacity currently in the project pipeline were 
to be included, the capacity utilization rate in those industries 
would be even lower:  it would be 71% for steel, 59% for cement, 
72% for plate glass and, breathtakingly, 4% for poly-crystalline 
silicon.131  In August 2010, the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology (“MIIT”) published a detailed list of 2,087 
firms that were slated to be partially or completely shut down by 
the end of September 2010 due to excess capacity concerns.132  The 
firms appearing on the MIIT list are spread in eighteen industries, 
including iron, steel, blast furnace coke, ferrous alloy, calcium 
carbide, aluminum electrode, copper smelting, lead smelting, zinc 
smelting, cement, glass, paper, ethanol, monosodium glutamate 
(“MSG”), citric acid, leather, dye, and chemical fiber.133  The excess 
capacity being tackled by the NDRC and MITT, however, is only 
the tip of the iceberg.  The industries mentioned above are on the 
government’s priority list primarily because they are considered 
key to the national economy or because they pose serious 
environmental concerns.  In addition to those industries, excess 
capacity has become a major problem in many other industries as 
well, including semiconductor,134 automobile,135 vitamin C,136
 
Duplicate Construction in Certain Industries in Order to Guide Healthy Industrial 
Development], NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION (Sept. 26, 2009), 
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbqt/2010qt/t20100513_346554.htm.  
 and 
130 Id.  The percentages are calculated using the figures provided by the 
NDRC document. 
131 Id.  The percentages are also calculated using the figures provided by the 
NDRC document. 
132 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongye he Xinxihua Bu Gonggao [Bulletin of 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China], 
MIIT Doc. No. [2010] 111, Aug. 5, 2010, http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472 
/n11293832/n11293907/n11368223/13333127.html (providing a list of firms to be 
shutdown due to excess capacity).  
133 Id. 
134 In the first three months of 2009, seventy percent of China’s 
semiconductor production capacity was idle.  See Andrew Batson, Stimulus 
Dilemma for China: Spending on Public Works Risks Making Production Glut Worse, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2009, at A6 (reporting that seventy percent of China’s 
semiconductor production was idle due to concerns of excess capacity). 
135 It has been reported that China’s auto industry “is expected to face excess 
capacity by 2012.”   China’s top fourteen auto makers alone “will have a combined 
. . . capacity of 23 million vehicles by 2012, though demand is only expected to 
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industrial commodities,137 to name just a few.  Since 2008, the 
threat of excess capacity has been looming even larger as China 
rolled out its four trillion yuan economic stimulus program as a 
response to the 2008–2009 global financial crisis.138
3.1.2. Structural Distortions Behind China’s Excess Capacity 
 
There are several reasons for China’s chronic excess capacity.  
The primary culprit, as it is often argued, is China’s abnormally 
high savings and investment rates.139  Domestic consumption in 
China has historically been low, and has trended even lower since 
the start of the new century.140  By 2007, the share of investment in 
GDP reached forty-three percent, up from about thirty-five percent 
at the beginning of the decade.141  The share of investment in GDP 
further increased to a staggering sixty-seven percent in 2009, 
thanks to the large spike in investment because of China’s 
economic stimulus program.142
 
reach 20 million by that time.”  Dan Gallagher, Chinese Auto Industry May Face 
Excess Capacity, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 3, 2010, 7:12 PM), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinese-auto-industry-may-face-excess-
capacity-2010-02-03. 
  With this high of an investment 
136 See Fagaiwei: Wu Da Cuoshi Ezhi Weishengsu C Channeng Guosheng [NDRC: 
Five Measures to Tackle Excess Capacity in Vitamin C], CHINA NEWS NET (Dec. 30, 
2009), http://finance.ifeng.com/news/industry/20091230/1648112.shtml (noting 
excess capacity in the vitamin C industry). 
137 See Yanzheng Li, Yuancailiao Gongye: Bufen Chanpin Channeng Guosheng 
Jiaju [Industrial Commodities: Excess Capacity in Certain Products Worsens], 
FINANCE.EASTDAY.COM (Jan. 30, 2010), http://finance.eastday.com/m/20100130 
/u1a4988960.html (commenting on the excess capacity problems in raw materials 
industries).  
138 See Batson, supra note 134 (discussing the excess capacity problems that 
resulted from the massive investment in the Chinese economy).  
139 See, e.g., Editorial, The Cost of China’s Excess Capacity, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Nov. 30, 2009, at 12 (arguing that China’s response to the current financial crisis 
through continued over-investment and savings has exacerbated excess capacity).  
140 At the beginning of the 2000s, overall consumption spending in China 
accounted for more than sixty percent of GDP.  That percentage declined to about 
fifty percent by 2007.  Meanwhile, household consumption in China declined to a 
record low of thirty-seven percent of GDP by 2007.   Jonathan Anderson, Solving 
China’s Rebalancing Puzzle, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2007, available at http://www.imf.org 
/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/anderson.htm.  
141 See id. (illustrating the increase in the investment share from 2000 to 2007). 
142 See Li Lin, Guding Zichan Touzi Jiaokuai Shangzhang: Ddifang Xiangmu 
Zengsu Gao Zhongyang Yibei [Fixed-Asset Investment Increases at Fast Pace: Local 
Projects Enjoy Rate of Increase Double That of Central Projects], ECON. OBSERVER (Mar. 
11, 2010), http://www.eeo.com.cn/Politics/shuju/2010/03/11/164886.shtml 
(providing information from the Bureau of Statistics on investment in China).   
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rate, the expansion of production capacity appears to be a natural 
consequence.143
However, China’s high investment rate is only part of the 
explanation why excess capacity is so widespread and persistent in 
China.  When it comes to excess capacity, what matters is not just 
the total amount of investment, but how investment is made.  In 
China, the investment-making process is predominantly a 
government-driven one.  Since the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China, investment control has been an important part 
of the government’s economic planning and control processes.  
Until very recently, all fixed-asset investment, even investment by 
private enterprises, was subject to government-imposed quotas 
and required approvals by the government.
 
144  Investment control 
in China, however, has largely been decentralized.  Back in the 
planned economy era, consistent with the trend towards a 
decentralized industrial structure,145 the central government 
already delegated to local governments the authority for 
approving and supervising investment projects in a number of 
sectors.146
 
143 As has been pointed out, China’s efforts to maintain a high economic 
growth rate through increasing investment will likely lead to even more excess 
capacity.  See The Cost of China’s Excess Capacity, supra note 139. 
  In the reform era, China’s investment control regime has 
144 For an explanation of China’s investment regime in the reform era 
through the 1990s, see YASHENG HUANG, INFLATION AND INVESTMENT CONTROLS IN 
CHINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS DURING THE REFORM 
ERA 63–88 (1996). In 2004, the State Council issued a policy document on 
reforming China’s investment regime.  Under the proposed new regime, 
investment not directly funded by the government, e.g., investment by SOEs 
using their retained profits or investment by private enterprises will not require 
approval (shenpi) from the government.  Depending on the scales and public 
interest implications of such projects, only “confirmation” (hezhun) or 
“registration” (beian) would be required.  State Council, Guowuyuan Guanyu Touzi 
Tizhi Gaige de Jueding [Decision by State Council on Reforms of Investment Regime], 
State Council Doc. No. [2004] 20, Jul. 16, 2004, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-
08/12/content_21939.htm [hereinafter State Council Decision on Reforms of 
Investment Regime]. 
145 See supra Part 2.2. (explaining the longstanding tradition of 
decentralization since the founding of the People’s Republic of China).   
146 Starting in the 1960s, the central government began to devolve a 
significant amount of investment control to local governments.  In 1964, the 
central government stipulated that capital investment in nineteen nonindustrial 
sectors, including forestry, education, health, local husbandry, and urban public 
utilities, should be the primary responsibilities of local governments.  In the 
subsequent years, “local governments acquired more investment authority over 
commercial distribution centers, local irrigation facilities, and some ‘small’ 
industries (e.g., [small cement and fertilizer factories]).”  HUANG, supra note 144, at 
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been further decentralized, with the central government now only 
approving larger investment projects in important sectors.147  In the 
first two months of 2010, for example, the amount of investment 
approved by local governments accounted for about ninety-one 
percent of all investment in urban areas in China.148  In addition to 
having the authority to approve investment, the central and local 
governments are the largest investors themselves.  Governments at 
various levels in China make investment either in their own 
capacity or through SOEs directly under their supervision, with the 
line between the two often blurred.  In 2006, the most recent year 
for which statistics on investment by ownership type are available, 
investment made by state entities (including SOEs and entities that 
are majority-controlled by the state) accounted for about forty-
eight percent of all investment in urban areas.149
While the decentralization of investment control has resulted in 
greater investment capabilities for local governments, it is the fiscal 
reforms that have provided incentives for local governments to 
 
 
66.  In 1974, in recognition of the increasingly important role of local governments 
in investment making, the central government “drew up the so-called four-three-
three plan for dividing up investment [responsibilities]” between the central and 
local governments.  Id.  Under this plan, “the central government managed about 
40 percent of the investment portfolio; the central and local governments together 
managed about 30 percent; and local governments managed the remaining 30 
percent.”  Id.  
147 China periodically publishes a list of investment projects that require 
“confirmation” by the government.  The list also specifies the level of government 
that is authorized to give such confirmations.  Generally, the central government 
is responsible for confirming only the largest projects, while the local 
governments are responsible for confirming the others.  For example, power 
generation plants with a capacity of 250,000 kilowatts or more have to be 
confirmed by the NDRC, while power generation plants with smaller capacities 
need only be confirmed by local governments.  See State Council Decision on 
Reforms of Investment Regime, supra note 144, app. (providing a list of information 
pertaining to investment projects requiring government confirmation).   
148 In the first two months of 2010, the total amount of investment in urban 
areas was 1,301.4 billion yuans, of which 1,179.5 billion yuans was approved by 
local governments and 121.9 billion yuans was approved by the central 
government.  See Lin, supra note 142 (describing the increase in local government 
investment as much greater than central government investment based upon 
statistics released by the National Bureau of Statistics).  
149 In 2006, the total amount of investment in urban areas was 9,347.2 billion 
yuans, while investment by state entities in urban areas was 4,521.2 billion yuans.  
See NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO 2006 
NIAN GUOMIN JINGJI HE SHEHUI FAZHAN TONGJI GONGBAO [REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2006 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS] (Feb. 28, 2007), 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20070228_402387821.htm 
(providing economical statistics on China’s investments for the year 2006). 
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make the best use of their investment capabilities.150  Under 
China’s current fiscal regime, the chief means for local 
governments to increase their revenues is to create new local 
enterprises and promote the growth of existing ones.151  This fiscal 
pressure leads to strong investment urges on the part of local 
governments.152  Investment made by government bureaucrats, 
however, often lacks sound commercial justifications.  In the case 
of China, much of the investment made under the auspices of local 
governments is made for the primary purpose of competing 
against other localities for both tax revenues and higher economic 
growth rates.153  Recall that prior to the start of economic reforms, 
China’s industrial structure was already decentralized, with 
industries being duplicated at the provincial level.154  Local 
governments’ strong motivations to out-invest one another in the 
reform era have led to widespread copycat investment, further 
adding to the duplication of industries at local levels.155
Admittedly, duplicate investment in and of itself is not that 
unusual.  Even in a market economy with little government 
meddling in the investment process, capacity formation cannot 
always accurately reflect market demand due to the uncertainties 
inherent in the marketplace.  But in a typical market economy, 
excess capacity tends to be eliminated by market forces relatively 
quickly, through bankruptcy of firms that lose out in the 
  As large 
sums of investment continue pouring into sectors already crowded 
with producers looking for buyers, excess capacity would appear 
inevitable. 
 
150 See supra Part 2.2. 
151 The major sources of tax revenues under China’s current fiscal regime are 
value added tax (75% assigned to the central government and 25% assigned to 
local governments), business tax (100% assigned to local governments except in 
certain industries), and enterprise income tax (60% assigned to the central 
government and 40% assigned to local governments).  OECD, CHALLENGES FOR 
CHINA’S PUBLIC SPENDING: TOWARD GREATER EFFECTIVENESS AND EQUITY 29 (2006).  
For local governments to increase their revenues from any of the three taxes, they 
need to increase the revenues or profits of local enterprises.  
152 See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
153 See HUANG, supra note 144, at 70–73 (discussing how competition between 
localities influences local economic investment decisions). 
154 See supra Part 2.2. 
155 For example, when envisioning their long-term industrial goals, twenty-
two provinces listed automobile manufacturing as a “pillar” industry, twenty-
four listed electronics as a pillar industry, sixteen listed machine-building and 
chemicals as a pillar industry, and fourteen listed metallurgy as a pillar industry.  
See PEI, supra note 61, at 129.  
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competition for customers.156  Arguably, this capacity 
formation/elimination cycle is precisely the trial and error process 
through which the market achieves the optimal allocation of 
resources.  But what makes China’s situation unusual is that not 
only is capacity formation distorted by the role of the government, 
but capacity elimination is distorted by the role of the government, 
too.  In China, much of the duplicate investment is made by SOEs, 
particularly SOEs supervised by local governments.  As discussed 
earlier, despite China’s efforts to commercialize and corporatize 
SOEs, many of them still shoulder responsibilities apart from profit 
considerations, such as the provision of employment and social 
services.157  For this reason, when SOEs become insolvent, the 
government is very reluctant to let them go into bankruptcy.158  
And, under China’s current tax regime, keeping loss-making SOEs 
in operation may even make financial sense for local governments, 
as long as the taxes paid by those SOEs—chiefly Value-Added-
Taxes (“VAT”) and Business Taxes—exceed their operating 
losses.159
 
156 A recent example of this capacity formation/elimination cycle in a market 
economy can be found in the fiber optic network industry in the United States.  At 
the beginning of the 2000s, “dozens of companies rushed to build fiber-optic 
networks, envisioning a new era of high-speed telecommunications.”  Anupreeta 
Das, Networks Hope to Cash in on Fiber, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2010, at B1.  But, the 
anticipated demand did not materialize soon enough before many of the 
companies declared bankruptcy.  Id. 
  Even if taxes paid by SOEs are not enough to cover their 
operating losses, in many cases the losses are borne not by local 
governments, but by the local branches of state-owned banks in the 
157 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
158 In August 2006, China enacted a new bankruptcy code that went into 
effect in June 2007.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Pochan Fa [The Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2006-08/28/content_371296.htm.  One of the central 
goals of the new bankruptcy code is to place SOEs on the same footing as private 
enterprises when it comes to bankruptcy.  In practice, however, the new 
bankruptcy code “has seen little use, with the government preferring negotiated 
solutions that keep workers at least nominally employed.”  Batson, supra note 134, 
at A6. 
159 China’s Value-Added-Tax and Business Tax are both taxes levied on 
turnovers, not profits.  See OECD, supra note 48, at 628 (“[VAT] applies to sales of 
all goods and imports of goods within [China] . . . . The business tax is levied on 
turnover of taxable services, transfer of intangible assets, or sales of immovable 
properties in China.”).  Therefore, as long as a firm is in operation, regardless of 
whether it makes a profit, it pays VAT or Business Taxes.  
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form of non-performing loans.160
3.1.3. “Excessive Competition” 
  Therefore, local governments 
have the incentives, as well as the means, to keep insolvent SOEs in 
operation and hence prolong, if not prevent, the elimination of 
excess capacity. 
The excess capacity in many of China’s industries, coupled 
with China’s low market concentration ratios,161 leads to enormous 
competitive pressures in those industries.  In fact, competition is so 
intense in many of China’s industries, and the industries affected 
are so wide-ranging, that a new term was coined in the Chinese 
lexicon to describe just this phenomenon:  “excessive competition” 
(guodu jingzheng).  An Internet search using the Chinese characters 
for the term would return hundreds of thousands of hits, most of 
which are Chinese media reports of intense competition in various 
industries.162  The industries that are reportedly affected by 
excessive competition are numerous, including cement,163 building 
materials,164 DVD players,165 electronics,166 LCD flat panels,167
 
160 Along with fiscal decentralization, the banking system has also been 
decentralized in the reform era.  Today, the local branches of state-owned banks 
are subject to “dual subordination” (shuangchong lingdao), i.e., subordination to the 
banking hierarchy as well as to local governments.  Over the years, local 
governments have gained great influence over credit decisions of the local 
branches of state-owned banks.  See QIAN & WEINGAST, supra note 44, at 16–17. 
 
161 See supra Part 2.3. 
162 See Bruce M. Owen et al., China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The Anti-
Monopoly Law and Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 247 (2008) (providing an 
overview of results of a Chinese Internet search using the term “excessive 
competition”). 
163 See Chuandong Quan Hangye Kuisun; Sichuan Shuini Guosheng Yali Tuxian 
[Cement Sees Sector Loss in Eastern Sichuan; Excess Capacity Looms], CHINA CEMENT, 
Jul. 15, 2010, http://www.chinacements.com/news/2010/7-14/C155418545.htm 
(commenting on the problems in the cement industry in the Sechuan province of 
China due to excessive competition).  
164 See Guodu Jingzheng Daozhi Beijing Jiancai Maichang Shengcun Buyi 
[Excessive Competition Leads to Low Odds of Survival in Beijing’s Building Materials 
Market], HC360 (Sept. 25, 2009), http://info.bm.hc360.com/2009/09 
/251625106771.shtml (describing problems faced in the building materials 
industry as a result of excessive competition). 
165 See Tong Yi, DVD Chichang Guodu Jingzheng Lirun Jihu Wei Ling [Excessive 
Competition in Market for DVD Players Leads to Almost Zero Profits in Industry], 
SHENZHEN TEQU BAO [SHENZHEN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE JOURNAL], Jan. 19, 2007, 
available at http://news.chinabyte.com/459/3046959.shtml (explaining problems 
faced in the DVD market as a result of excessive competition). 
166 See Guodu Jingzheng Dianzi ye Zengchan Nan Zeng Lirun [Excessive 
Competition in Electronics Industry: Production Up, But Profits Down], GUANGZHOU 
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dairy products,168 biomass power,169 retails,170 construction,171 
airlines,172 and ocean shipping,173
 
DAILY, Oct. 13, 2005, available at http://cn.ppzw.com/Article_Show_23288.html 
(explaining problems in the electronics industry resulting from excessive 
competition). 
 to name just a few. 
167 See Yejing Mianban Quan Hangye Kuisun: Guonei Xin 8 Dai Xian Qianjing 
Hezai [Sector Loss for LCD Flat Panels: Where Does the Future of the Eighth-Generation 
Production Lines Lie?], DIYI CAIJING RIBAO [FIRST BUSINESS & FINANCE DAILY], Sept. 
3, 2009, available at, http://finance.oeeee.com/a/20090903/269113.html 
(describing losses in the LCD television market from excessive competition). 
168 See Zhongguo Naiye Jinru Panzheng Qi: Niunai Shoujia Huidao Shinian 
Zhiqian [China’s Dairy Industry in Consolidation Mode: Milk Prices Drop to Levels 
Unseen in Ten Years], SHICHANG BAO [MARKET DAILY], Jan. 21, 2008, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-01/21/content_7460884.htm 
(attributing milk price increases due to overall rise in the market, i.e. excessive 
competition). 
169 See Shandong Shengwuzhi Fadian Qiye Jihu Quanbu Kuisun [Almost All 
Biomass Power Plants in Shandong Province Operate at Losses], YOUGUOW, July 13, 
2010, http://www.youguow.com/2010/0713/15633.html (explaining the effect of 
challenges stemming from excess competition on the energy industry). 
170 See Xiaoding Wu & Xiaoyan Wang, Jilin Sheng Daxing Lingshou Qiye Guodu 
Jingzheng de Yuanyin Ji Duice Yanjiu [Causes of and Policy Responses to Excessive 
Competition Among Large Retailers in Jilin Province], QKZZ.NET, 
http://qkzz.net/article/de2a0525-9151-4bf7-ab0c-43e358a07f11.htm (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2010) (discussing the effects of excess competition on the retail industry in 
the Jilin Province and proposing potential solutions). 
171 See Jianzhu Shigong Qiye Shichang Jingzheng de “Nitan”: Guanyu Jianzhu 
Hangye Guodu Jingzheng de Sikao [Construction Firms Trapped in Market Competition: 
Thoughts on Excessive Competition in the Construction Industry], ZGJZY.ORG (Dec. 26, 
2006), http://www.zgjzy.org/guild/sites/ccia/detail.asp?i=ZT&id=10077 
(discussing the effects of excessive competition on the construction industry 
including hyper-competitive market share, fierce price competition, and disorder 
stemming from non-standard competition). 
172 See Hangkongye Guodu Jingzheng: San Da Hang Huo Zai Chongzu [Excessive 
Competition in the Airline Industry; Restructuring of the Big Three Airlines is a 
Possibility], SHIDAI ZHOUKAN [TIMES WEEKLY], May 6, 2010, available at 
http://i.lwcj.com/news/news100506003.htm (explaining the effects of excessive 
competition in the airline industry, particularly on the three major airlines). 
173 See Haiyun Jing Xian “Fu Baojia” [Startling: Negative Shipping Fees in Ocean 
Shipping Industry], JIAODIAN FANGTAN [FOCUS INTERVIEWS], Sept. 22, 2006, available 
at http://news.sohu.com/20060922/n245477144.shtml [hereinafter Negative Ocean 
Shipping Charges] (discussing the fierce competition in the ocean shipping industry 
and how it has caused negative shipping rates through a transcript of a China 
Central TV broadcast); 14 Jia Riben Hangxie Chuandong Zucheng Yunjia Zilü 
Lianmeng [Fourteen Shipping Companies Operating in Sino-Japan Shipping Routes Form 
Self-Discipline Coalition], TIANJIN OCEAN NETWORK, July 30, 2009, available at, 
http://www.t-shipping.net/a/20090730/674.html [hereinafter Sino-Japan Ocean 
Shipping Price Coalition] (reporting on an agreement between Chinese shipping 
companies to provide reasonable transport at a reasonable rate). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
ZHENG.DOC 1/13/2011 6:47 PM 
684 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:2 
On its face, the term “excessive competition” is puzzling, as it 
suggests that there is a “right” amount of competition above which 
competition will become “excessive”.  In a typical market 
economy, competition is the very mechanism through which the 
market “discovers” the price that best allocates scarce resources 
among competing uses.  It appears to make little economic sense, 
therefore, to speak of competition as if it required intrinsic 
limitations.174
A closer examination of the circumstances of competition in 
China’s industries does confirm that competition is indeed 
“excessive” in many industries from an economic efficiency point 
of view.  In a typical market economy, competition usually occurs 
on both price and product quality dimensions.  But in China, the 
abundance of small-scale firms
  But China is not a typical market economy, at least 
not yet.  As discussed earlier, because of the transitional stage 
China is currently in, the market environment in which 
competition takes place in China is still distorted by state control of 
both capacity formation and capacity elimination.  In such a 
distorted environment, competition may well be “excessive” if it 
leads to outcomes that are not socially optimal from an economic 
efficiency point of view.  
175 dictates that a large number of 
Chinese firms lack the financial capabilities to engage in product 
differentiation through technological innovation.176
 
174 In essence, this view of competition is what drives the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s opinion in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), 
where the Court reaffirmed that price fixing was a per se violation of Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.  See Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 218 (“[T]his Court has 
consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing 
agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act, and that no showing of 
so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to 
eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense.”).  
  Also 
contributing to the lack of innovation in China’s marketplace is the 
175 See supra Part 2.2. 
176 Particularly, because of their limited financing abilities and preferences for 
immediate results, local governments in China typically prefer investing in small, 
easy-to-build firms.  Many of those firms, as a result, are still utilizing sub-par or 
even obsolete technologies.  In the cement industry, for example, thirty-eight 
percent of China’s cement capacity consists of “shaft” kilns, which have been 
obsolete in most of the rest of the world for over a century, and accounted for less 
than three percent of production even in 1957.  See Mark DeWeaver, China’s 
Excess-Capacity Nightmare, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.project 
-syndicate.org/commentary/deweaver2/English (explaining how small regional 
firms in China utilize cheap, obsolete technology to increase regional benefits, but 
which cause harm to the industry as a whole). 
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country’s lax protection of intellectual property rights.177  As a 
result, competition in many industries in China occurs on one 
dimension alone, i.e., price.  The fact that intense price competition 
drives industry profits to abnormally low or even negative levels is 
common to almost all of the reported instances of excessive 
competition.178  In some industries, the intensity of price 
competition has reached a staggering level.  In the ocean shipping 
industry operating between Shanghai and Japan, for example, 
price competition once reached a point where shipping companies 
charged shippers negative shipping fees, with a weekly loss of 
about $760,000 for an average shipping company.179  Not 
surprisingly, the only firms that could remain standing under such 
intense competition and heavy losses were SOEs.180  The enormous 
downward pressures on price are not limited to China’s domestic 
industries, but are felt by China’s trading partners on the world 
stage as well.  In 2005, a senior Chinese trade official lamented that 
the root cause of the rising number of antidumping proceedings 
against Chinese products in overseas markets was the “vicious 
competition” among Chinese firms.181  In addition, intense price 
competition has posed product safety concerns, as some financially 
squeezed firms seek to cut corners on raw materials and product 
quality.182
 
177 For general discussions on the protection of intellectual property rights in 
China, see JIANQIANG NIE, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
CHINA (2006). 
 
178 See supra notes 163–73 and accompanying text. 
179 See Negative Ocean Shipping Charges, supra note 173. 
180 It was noted that in the Sino-Japan Ocean shipping industry, all of the 
firms that were quoting negative shipping fees were SOEs.  Id. 
181 See Long Yongtu: “Fan Qingxiao” Genzi Zaiyu Guonei Qiye Exing Jingzheng 
[Long Yongtu: Malignant Competition Among Domestic Firms the Root Cause of 
Antidumping Cases], ANHUINEWS (Jun. 13, 2005), http://finance.anhuinews.com 
/system/2005/06/13/001282695.shtml (discussing the notion that vicious 
competition among domestic companies is the main reason why China faces so 
many antidumping proceedings, and advocating strong regulation of the 
domestic trade environment).   
182 In recent years, Chinese products have been involved in numerous safety 
and quality scandals, both domestically and abroad.  The most notorious of the 
recent scandals is the 2008 milk contamination incident, where at least three 
children died and tens of thousands more became ill after drinking milk 
contaminated with melamine, a cheap industrial chemical that, if added to raw 
milk, would make milk seem as though it is in higher protein than it actually is.  
See Gordon Fairclough, Tainting of Milk is Open Secret in China, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 
2008, at A1 (reporting on how Chinese dairy farmer’s spiked their milk with the 
toxin melamine in order to artificially increase the protein levels when tested by 
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3.1.4. Cartels as Disguised Price Control 
When competitive pressures are up, so are the incentives to 
organize cartels.  China has proven no exception to this rule.  As 
discussed earlier, beginning in the early 1990s, China’s price 
liberalization began advancing at a fast pace.183  Unshackled from 
the government’s price control, Chinese firms began to use price as 
a competitive weapon.  It did not take the firms very long to learn, 
however, that price competition did not always work in their 
favor.  In 1993, in what appears to be China’s first price cartel in 
modern history, five top retail outlets for electrical appliances in 
Beijing conspired to increase the price of washing machines sold at 
their stores by 10%.184  That was only one year after the price 
control for light industry goods, which included washing 
machines, was abolished.185
Ever since the first price cartel in 1993, China’s cartel policy has 
been caught in a tug-of-war between two forces brought about by 
China’s price reforms.  On one hand, the general trend towards 
price liberalization requires the setting of prices by the market, and 
any interference with the setting of prices by the market, including 
efforts by cartels to fix prices, is undoubtedly against the 
fundamental goal of price liberalization.  As a result, as price 
reforms deepened, China has sought to ban cartels, at least as a 
matter of principle.  The 1997 Price Law, enacted after the bulk of 
China’s price liberalization was completed, contained China’s first 
legal provision banning price fixing.
 
186
 
health inspectors).  It has been noted by the Chinese media that excessive 
competition in the dairy industry is to blame for the incident.  See Buke Jiang, 
Sanlu Nai An Shi Guodu Jingzheng De Jieguo [Sanlu Milk Incident an Outcome of 
Excessive Competition], CNAOTOP.COM (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.cnadtop.com 
/brand/superBrands/2009/1/8/1e0bec56-3ea2-4414-9a33-e7987b6d4efc.htm 
(explaining that continued excessive competition will always lead to violations by 
companies trying to turn a profit and suggesting price competition restraints, 
government regulations on competition, and implementing strategies to avoid 
severe competition).  
  Price fixing also topped the 
183 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
184 INTERNAL MARKET, supra note 29, at 134. 
185 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
186 See Price Law, supra note 39, art. 14(1) (instituting a ban on collusive 
behavior that manipulates market prices and causes detriment to others operating 
in the market or consumers). 
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list of prohibited pricing conduct in a regulation issued by the 
NDRC in 2003187 and, most recently, the AML.188
On the other hand, government regulators in China continue to 
see a positive role of cartels in addressing structural distortions 
caused by the incompleteness of price reforms.  As discussed 
earlier, although firms, particularly SOEs, have been granted the 
power to decide on pricing on their own, they are still not entirely 
responsible for the consequences of their pricing decisions because 
of soft budget constraints and government-imposed exit barriers.  
And many of the firms competing in China’s industries would not 
have been there in the first place but for the distortive role of the 
governments, particularly local governments, in the investment 
process.  Government regulators soon found out that under such 
structural distortions, unbridled competition would only lead to 
unbridled price wars, which in turn would lead to the draining of 
the state’s coffer and the pile-up of non-performing loans in state-
owned banks.  As a result, China’s government regulators have, as 
discussed below, looked to cartels as a means of reinstating some 
sort of price control that was abolished in the price reforms. 
 
Initially, the government’s efforts to reinstate price control took 
the form of direct government regulation of price.  In June 1998, 
the National Bureau of Building Materials (one of the national 
bureaus downgraded from ministries and subordinated under the 
State Economic and Trade Commission (“SETC”) in 1998),189 in 
conjunction with the then State Development and Planning 
Commission (the predecessor to the NDRC), issued a regulation 
prohibiting sales of plate glass at below-cost prices, a practice 
widespread in the plate glass industry due to intense, or as it later 
became known, “excessive” competition.190
 
187 NDRC, Zhizhi Jiage Longduan Xingwei Zhanxing Guiding [Provisional 
Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Pricing], art. 4(1), Jun. 18, 2003, NDRC Order 
No. 3, http://www.jincao.com/fa/09/law09.47.htm [hereinafter NDRC 
Provisional Provisions on Monopoly Pricing]. 
  The regulation 
188 See AML, supra note 10, art. 13(1) (prohibiting monopoly agreements 
among competing operators that fix or change the price of a commodity). 
189 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
190 See State Development and Planning Commission & National Bureau of 
Building Materials, Guanyu Zhizhi Dijia Qingxiao Pingban Boli De Bu zhengdang 
Jingzheng Xingwei De Zhanxing Guiding [Provisional Provisions on Prohibition of Sales 
of Plate Glass at Below-Cost Prices], Jun. 15, 1998, http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=13983 [hereinafter Provisional Provisions on Plate 
Glass] (prohibiting the sale of plate glass at below-cost prices in order to maintain 
fair, open, and lawful market competition).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
ZHENG.DOC 1/13/2011 6:47 PM 
688 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:2 
authorized the National Bureau of Building Materials to 
periodically calculate and publish a “social average cost of 
production” for each type of plate glass,191 and ordered 
manufacturers to price above those costs.192
In essence, the regulation on plate glass pricing was a 
throwback to the price control era, as it imposed price floors in an 
industry that had already seen complete price liberalization.  This 
development was hardly consistent with the general trend away 
from price setting by the government.  Therefore, two months 
later, when the SETC picked up the idea of price floors and 
expanded it to additional products, it implemented the price floors 
not through direct government regulation, but through 
“voluntary” industry action.  In August 1998, the SETC issued an 
opinion calling for the implementation of the so-called “industrial 
self-discipline prices” in certain industries.
 
193  The SETC opinion 
required industrial associations194 to determine, in consultation 
with the national bureaus, “industrial self-discipline prices” based 
on social average costs of production.195  The implementation of 
industrial self-discipline prices was to rely on “equal coordination, 
mutual monitoring, and self discipline” among or by firms.196  
Apparently, what was expected of firms under the SETC opinion 
was little different from price fixing, albeit with government 
approval.  Note that it was only one year earlier that the Price Law 
explicitly outlawed price fixing.197
 
191 Id. art. 4. 
  Subsequent to the issuance of 
the SETC opinion, industrial self-discipline prices, or more 
192 Id. art. 5 (mandating that manufacturer prices should not dip below the 
average social cost). 
193 See State Economic and Trade Commission, Guanyu Bufen Gongye Chanpin 
Shixing Hangye Zilü Jia De Yijian [Opinion on the Implementation of Industrial Self-
Discipline Price for Certain Industrial Products], Aug. 17, 1998 (on file with author) 
[hereinafter SETC 1998 Opinion on Industrial Self-Discipline Prices] (explaining that 
the manufacturer’s price should be based on the ex-factory price or lowest 
average cost). 
194 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
195 See SETC 1998 Opinion on Industrial Self-Discipline Prices, supra note 193, 
art. 2(1)–(2) (explaining that the self-discipline price should be based on the lowest 
average cost or post-factory price). 
196 Id. art. 1(1). 
197 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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accurately, government-sanctioned price cartels, were 
implemented for as many as twenty-one products.198
The tension between the need for market pricing, called for by 
price reforms, and the need for limits on market pricing, called for 
by structural distortions caused by the incompleteness of price 
reforms, has led to a wide gap between how cartels are treated 
under formal laws and how cartels are treated in practice.  On one 
hand, there are laws and regulations that strictly prohibit cartels.  
On the other hand, there are public, widespread attempts at cartels, 
so public and so widespread that the media routinely reports them 
with a sense of resignment or even normalcy.  In the color TV 
industry, for instance, five publicly reported attempts were made 
to organize nationwide price or production cartels by China’s 
largest color TV manufacturers in a short period of two years 
between April 1998 and June 2000.
 
199  In the VCD player industry, 
three publicly reported attempts were made to organize 
nationwide price cartels between May 1997 and May 2000.200  In 
late 2005, twenty-three of China’s largest aluminum electrode 
producers announced the formation of a production cartel to 
jointly reduce their volumes of production by ten percent.201  The 
producers made the announcement in a very high-profile manner, 
seemingly unconcerned by the NDRC’s 2003 regulation on 
monopoly pricing that explicitly banned production cartels like the 
one they were organizing.202
 
198 See Yanbei Meng, Fanlongduan Fa Dui Shichang Zhuti Zizhu Dingjia Quan 
De Xianzhi [Restrictions on Pricing Power of Market Entities Under Antitrust Law], 
FAXUE ZAZHI [LEGAL SCI. MAG.], Nov. 6, 2005 (discussing China’s Anti-Monopoly 
Law and the autonomy of market players in determining pricing).  
  In the airline industry, there have 
been repeated attempts at price cartels to curb ever-increasing 
price competition.  It was reported that in March 2005, almost all of 
199 See SCOTT KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS OF LOBBYING IN CHINA 113 (2005) 
(discussing the price fixing attempts by cartels to stabilize prices in the color TV 
industry and how those efforts repeatedly failed). 
200 See id. tbl.4.2 (documenting attempts by the VCD industry to set price 
floors from May 1997 to May 2000). 
201 See Zhongguo 23 Jia Dianjielü Gugan Qiye Jiang Lianhe Jianchan 10% [Twenty-
Three of China’s Largest Aluminum Electrode Manufacturers to Jointly Reduce 
Production by Ten Percent], Dec. 2, 2005, http://www.cnmn.com.cn 
/ShowNews.aspx?id=55765 (explaining that a rapid growth in China’s electrolytic 
aluminum industry led to a rapid increase in costs, leaving businesses with an 
overall loss).  
202 See NDRC Provisional Provisions on Monopoly Pricing, supra note 187, art. 
4(2) (“Operators are prohibited from . . . manipulating price through [jointly] 
imposing restrictions on output.”). 
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China’s airline companies were involved in a “price coalition” 
aimed at propping up ticket prices for flights between Beijing and 
seven major Chinese cities.203  In April 2009, eight months after the 
AML went into effect, “price coalition” reappeared in the airline 
industry, this time in the form of a new industry price quoting 
system that lowered the basis for calculating price discounts.204  
Similarly, the ocean shipping industry operating the Sino-Japan 
shipping routes has seen repeated attempts to organize price 
cartels as a means of stopping zero or negative shipping charges.  
One such attempt was made in the summer of 2005,205 followed by 
another attempt in August 2009.206
The government’s attitudes towards cartels, not surprisingly, 
have been ambivalent at best.  Only in very few cases has the 
NDRC rigorously enforced the anti-cartel provisions of the Price 
Law, the AML, and its own 2003 regulation on monopoly 
pricing.
  
207  All of those cases involved daily necessities and likely 
implicated non-antitrust concerns such as social stability.  In the 
remaining cases, the NDRC and other government regulators have 
been silent about cartels, or even have played an active role in 
organizing cartels themselves.208
 
203 See Guonei Hangkong Gongsi Dacheng Jiage Tongmeng; Jipiao Jiage Pubian 
Shangsheng [China’s Airline Companies Form Price Coalition; Air Ticket Prices 
Increase], BEIJING XIANDAI SHANGBAO [Beijing Modern Business Journal], Apr. 4, 
2005, 
  As discussed earlier, this 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20050404/07401484238.shtml 
(suggesting domestic airlines formed a price-fixing cartel because, while airline 
representatives remained silent, the ticket prices were surprisingly consistent). 
204 See Wu Da Hangkong Gongsi Yi Gongmou Zhangjia; Fangan Huo Minhangju 
Renke [Five Airline Companies Suspected for Colluding to Raise Prices; Scheme Approved 
by General Administration of Civil Aviation], GUANGZHOU RIBAO [GUANGZHOU 
DAILY], Apr. 22, 2009, http://finance.jrj.com.cn/2009/04/2209124197055.shtml.  
205 See Negative Ocean Shipping Charges, supra note 173. 
206 See Sino-Japan Ocean Shipping Price Coalition, supra note 173. 
207 In recent years, the NDRC took enforcement action against only three 
price cartels, all in the food or agricultural sector.  See, e.g., Hannah C.L. Ha et al., 
China Steps Up Antitrust Capacity Building—Cartels a Focus, MONDAQ, Jul. 20, 2010, 
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=105788 (noting, in July 2010, the 
NDRC made public its enforcement action in October 2009 against members of a 
price cartel involving mung bean); Kala Anandarajah & Dominique Lombardi, 
China’s First Public Anti-Cartel Action Under the Anti-Monopoly Law, MONDAQ, Jun. 
11, 2010, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=102700 (noting that the 
NDRC, in March 2010, made public its enforcement action against twenty-one 
members of a rice noodle cartel in the Guangxi Autonomous Region). 
208 It is reported that the government in recent years has been actively 
encouraging “price cooperation” among airline companies as a means of coping 
with increasing competition and losses.  See Zhongguo Si Da Hangkong Lianshou 
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tolerance or promotion of cartels is in essence a disguised effort to 
reinstate some sort of price control in an economy where 
incomplete price reforms have led to widespread structural 
distortions.  An argument could be made that under such 
structural distortions, the government’s tolerance or promotion of 
cartels, if successful, would not be as welfare-reducing as it would 
be in a typical market economy, or may even be welfare-
improving, because the “market” prices prevailing under such 
structural distortions do not necessarily represent maximum 
economic efficiency.   In addition, the government’s tolerance or 
promotion of cartels, if successful, may not harm consumers as 
much as it would in a typical market economy, as consumers 
would have incurred harms of comparable magnitudes, albeit 
indirectly, in the form of SOE losses but for successful cartels.  But 
leaving these normative issues aside, the bottom line seems to be 
that China, despite all of its stringent anti-cartel laws on the books, 
is unlikely to develop a rigorous anti-cartel policy before structural 
distortions in its economy are removed, which likely will take at 
least a while, if it happens at all. 
It is worth noting, however, that as important as China’s cartel 
policy may be for formal antitrust analysis, it probably will not 
make too big a practical difference either way.  In most of China’s 
industries where competition is so intense that cartels have been 
attempted, such attempts, even with active government 
encouragement, have almost invariably failed because of cartel 
members’ enormous incentives to cheat in a highly competitive 
environment.  For instance, all of the five color TV cartels and the 
three VCD player cartels in the late 1990s failed in a few weeks, not 
because the government cracked down on them, but because there 
were always cartel members who were willing to undercut their 
co-conspirators.209
 
Zhiding Piaojia Yi Tisheng Lirun [China’s Big Four Airlines Jointly Set Prices to Increase 
Profits], XIAMEN HUOYUN WANG [LOGISTICS WEBSITE OF THE CITY OF XIAMEN] (Mar. 
15, 2010), 
  Similarly, the 2005 price cartel in the Sino-Japan 
http://www.xmwuliu.net/WuLiuXinWen/20100315/89748.html 
(suggesting that pricing cooperation among airlines has been encouraged by the 
government in order to expand airlines’ profit margins).  In the ocean shipping 
industry, the Ministry of Transportation reportedly took an active role in 
organizing the 2009 price cartel in the Sino-Japan ocean shipping industry.  See 
Sino-Japan Ocean Shipping Price Coalition, supra note 173 (explaining the Ministry of 
Transportation’s actions with regard to the 2009 price cartel and tariff filing 
procedures in the Sino-Japan ocean shipping industry).  
209 See KENNEDY, supra note 199, at 113–16 (describing the TV and VCD player 
cartels’ incentives to cheat and set price floors, thereby cannibalizing their 
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ocean-shipping industry lasted for only three days.210  And the 
March 2009 price-fixing scheme in the airline industry, reportedly 
supported by the government, collapsed in only one week.211  The 
ineffectiveness of using cartels as disguised price controls, as seen 
in China, is one additional demonstration of the irreversibility of 
price liberalization in transitional economies.212
3.2. Abuse of Dominance:  Exclusionary or Exploitative? 
  If anything, this 
should provide China with more incentives to complete price 
reforms and remove structural distortions from its economy, rather 
than rely on cartels that will not be helpful anyway. 
A central task of antitrust law is to regulate the conduct of 
firms that have market power.213  A monopolist will be able to 
reduce output and sell at a price higher than the price under 
perfect competition, causing inefficiency and wealth transfers from 
the consumer to the monopolist.214  Antitrust law, however, has 
generally distinguished abusive conduct of dominant firms from 
legitimate conduct of such firms.  Under antitrust law, a dominant 
market position is not per se illegal; it is the abuse of that position 
that will invite antitrust scrutiny.215
 
market).  It should be added that the reason why so many attempts at cartels were 
made in such a short period is precisely because those attempts did not work. 
  Antitrust law has generally 
210 See Negative Ocean Shipping Charges, supra note 173. 
211 “2 Zhe Jipiao” Zaixian; “Jipiao Jiage Tongmeng” Yizhou Wajie [“Twenty-
Percent Discount Air Tickets” Reappears; Airline Price Coalition Collapses in One Week], 
FINANCE EASTDAY (Apr. 28, 2009), http://finance.eastday.com/m/20090428 
/u1a4339142.html.  
212 The irreversibility of price liberalization in transitional economies was first 
demonstrated in Russia in January 1993, when efforts to re-impose price control 
on key foodstuffs and basic raw materials by the Chernomyrdin Administration 
were aborted after merely two weeks.  See David Hearst, Russian PM is Forced to 
Revoke Price Controls: Cabinet Divided as Key Economic Strategist Calls Idea 
“Unworkable,” THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 15, 1993, at 9 (explaining that re-instating price 
controls was impractical since there was no system in place to assess profitability 
at different enterprises).  
213 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust 
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981) (defining market power as the seller’s 
ability to raise and sustain a price increase without losing so many sales that it 
must rescind the increase). 
214 See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:  
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 33 (2000) (explaining that allocative inefficiency results 
as buyers who would have purchased the product at a competitive price will no 
longer do so at the higher monopoly price).  
215 The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, once held that a firm with market 
power would be allowed to retain that power if it was the outcome of “a superior 
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recognized two types of abuses of dominant market position: 
exclusionary and exploitative.  Exclusionary conduct, such as price 
predation, refusal to deal with a competitor, and raising rivals’ 
costs, seeks to exclude competition and competitors from the 
market and create or maintain the dominant firm’s market 
power.216  Exploitative conduct, by contrast, exploits “other market 
participants without directly affecting the structure of the market. . 
. .”217  A typical exploitative conduct is the charging of high prices 
to consumers, known as “excessive pricing” under the antitrust 
laws of the EU218 and some other countries.219  The line between 
exclusionary and exploitative abuses, however, is not always clear.  
Some practices, such as exclusive dealing, tying, and price 
discrimination, could be used to exclude competitors, but could 
also be used to exploit customers directly.220
Over the years, the antitrust laws of the United States and the 
European Union (two major sources of modern antitrust 
jurisprudence) have developed different approaches towards 
exclusionary and exploitative abuses.  In the United States, 
antitrust law in abuse-of-dominance cases has focused on 
 
 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.”  United States v. Grinnell Corp., 
384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). 
216 See Russell Pittman & Maria Tineo, Abuse of Dominance Enforcement Under 
Latin American Competition Laws, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN TRANS-ATLANTIC 
ANTITRUST 325 (Philip Marsden ed., 2006) (defining exclusionary conduct as 
actions “aimed directly at the preserving or exacerbating of anticompetitive 
aspects of the structure of the market: conduct that creates or maintains the 
monopolist’s power, in which the firm tries to suppress competition. . . .”). 
217 Id.  
218 See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, May 9, 2008, 2008 
O.J. (C 115) art. 102(a) [hereinafter TFEU] (“directly or indirectly imposing unfair 
purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions”). 
219 See Pittman & Tineo, supra note 216, at 326 (listing Argentina, Brazil, Peru, 
and Venezuela as countries whose antitrust laws prohibit excessive and 
exploitative pricing); see also Ariel Ezrachi & David Gilo, Excessive Pricing, Entry, 
Assessment and Investment: Lessons from the Mittal Litigation, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 873, 
874 n.5 (2010) (explaining that excessive pricing is prohibited by the antitrust laws 
of South Africa, Israel, and Russia). 
220 In fact, Judge Posner has argued that “some of the practices deemed as 
exclusionary, mainly price discrimination in its various guises (including most tie-
in agreements), are monopolistic but not exclusionary. . . .  They enable the 
monopolist to extract higher profits without preventing equally or more efficient 
new entrants from challenging his monopoly.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW 41–42 (2d ed. 2001).  Cf. Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition? 
Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371 (2002) 
(questioning whether exploitative abuse is the only one type of abuse under 
antitrust law). 
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exclusionary conduct, and has refrained from attacking purely 
exploitative conduct such as excessive pricing.221  Although in 
recent years scholarly opinions in the United States have favored 
requiring an exploitative effect for exclusionary conduct to be 
actionable under antitrust law,222 exclusionary effect is still a 
necessary element for a successful abuse-of-dominance claim in the 
United States.  By contrast, EU antitrust law appears to have a 
broader focus.  The EU treaty provision that prohibits abuses of 
dominant market position, i.e., TFEU Article 102, explicitly covers 
exploitative conduct.223  But by and large, enforcement in the EU 
against purely exploitative conduct has been fairly limited,224 and 
according to the European Commission’s official communication, 
the Commission’s enforcement priorities in the abuse-of-
dominance area are exclusionary conduct.225
 
221 See Brian A. Facey & Dany H. Assaf, Monopolization and Abuse of 
Dominance in Canada, the United States, and the European Union: A Survey, 70 
ANTITRUST L. J. 513, 544 (2002) (“In Canada and in the United States, 
monopolization or abuse of dominance laws appear to focus on anticompetitive 
acts relating to exclusionary conduct that maintain or create market power and 
harm the competitive process, as opposed to simply harming a competitor or 
merely charging high prices or exploiting consumers.”). 
 
222 For some of these opinions, see Pittman & Tineo, supra note 216, at 332–33 
n.30 (citing Robert Pitofsky, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under U.S. Antitrust 
Law, 70 ANTITRUST L. J. 443 (2002); Brian A. Facey & Dany H. Assaf, Monopolization 
and Abuse of Dominance in Canada, the United States, and the European Union: A 
Survey, 70 ANTITRUST L. J. 513, 544–45 (2002); Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the 
Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST L. J. 693 (2000); David A. Balto & Ernest A. 
Nagata, Proof of Competitive Effects in Monopolization Cases: a Response to Professor 
Muris, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 309 (2001); Timothy J. Muris, Anticompetitive Effects in 
Monopolization Cases: Reply, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 325 (2001); Eleanor M. Fox, What is 
Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST 
L. J. 371, 376 (2002)).   
223 See Pinar Akman, Exploitative Abuse in Article 82EC: Back to Basics? 9–10 
(Ctr. for Competition Pol’y, Working Paper No. 09–1, 2009) (explaining that there 
is comprehensive evidence supporting the notion that Article 82EC covers 
exploitative conduct).  Indeed, it has been argued that Article 82EC was originally 
meant to cover only exploitative conduct.  Id. 
224 The EU competition authority, for example, has attacked excessive pricing 
very rarely.  See Massimo Motta & Alexandre de Streel, Excessive Pricing and Price 
Squeeze Under EU Law, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2003: WHAT IS AN 
ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION? 91 (C.D. Ehlermann & I. Atanasiu eds., 2006) 
(providing a discussion of the EC Treaty’s Article 82 and EU case law to illustrate 
the EC Treaty’s condemnation of exploitative and excessive pricing).  
225 See European Community Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary 
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) (Feb. 24, 2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/index.html (discussing the 
EU’s priorities in applying Article 82 to exclusionary conduct). 
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Therefore, despite the conceptual differences between U.S. and 
EU antitrust laws in the abuse-of-dominance area, in practice both 
have focused on exclusionary conduct.  As discussed below, this 
exclusion-focused paradigm appears to have been adopted by the 
AML as well.  
In keeping with the civil law tradition of spelling out statutory 
prohibitions,226 the AML in Article 17 provides a non-exhaustive 
list of six types of conduct that are considered abuses of dominant 
market position.227
 
226 See Pittman & Tineo, supra note 216, at 326 & n.32 (citing Malcolm B. 
Coate, René Bustamante & A.E. Rodriguez, Antitrust in Latin America: Regulating 
Government and Business, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. Rev. 37, 53–54 (1992)). 
  Those six types of conduct resemble what are 
generally referred to as excessive pricing, predatory pricing, 
refusal to deal, exclusive dealing, tying, and price discrimination 
under U.S. and EU antitrust laws.  Article 17, however, is 
ambiguous about the scope of its prohibition.  It is clear that Article 
17 prohibits one type of purely exploitative conduct—excessive 
pricing.  But it is not clear whether the other types of prohibited 
conduct encompass only exclusionary conduct, or both 
exclusionary and exploitative conduct.  For example, “refusal to 
deal” as prohibited under Article 17(3) could be exclusionary if the 
dominant firm refuses to deal with a competitor, but could also be 
exploitative if the dominant firm refuses to deal with a consumer, 
harming the consumer directly.  The usage of the generic term 
“transaction counterparties” in Article 17 does not indicate 
227 Article 17 of the AML reads in full: 
An undertaking that possesses a dominant market position is prohibited 
from engaging in the following conduct that abuses its dominant market 
position: 
Selling goods at unfairly high prices or buying goods at unfairly low 
prices; 
Selling goods at below-cost prices without justifications; 
Refusal to deal with transaction counterparties without justifications; 
Restricting transaction counterparties to only deal with the undertaking 
or undertakings designated by the undertaking without justifications; 
Tying the sale of goods or imposing other unreasonable conditions on a 
transaction without justifications; 
Discriminatory treatment of similarly situated transaction counterparties 
with respect to price or other transaction terms without justifications; 
Other conduct that constitutes abuse of dominant market position as 
determined by the Antimonopoly Enforcement Agency. 
AML, supra note 10, art. 17. 
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whether Article 17 intends to cover the former or latter “refusal to 
deal,” or both. 
But what is missing in Article 17 appears to have been filled by 
another article.  Article 6, one of the AML’s “general provisions” 
(zongze), provides that “undertakings that have a dominant market 
position are prohibited from abusing that position to exclude or 
impede competition.”228  By virtue of being in the general provisions, 
Article 6 applies to the entire statute, including Article 17.  Thus 
Article 6 appears to limit the conduct prohibited under Article 17 
to exclusionary conduct only, perhaps with the exception of 
excessive pricing, which is specifically listed under Article 17 but is 
purely exploitative.229
However, the focus of antitrust law on exclusionary conduct 
presupposes the existence of competitors or at least potential 
competitors to be excluded.  As discussed below, this 
presupposition may not hold in China’s “monopoly industries,” 
where the number of firms tends to be small and market entry 
tends to be tightly controlled by the state.
 
230
3.2.1. Abuse-of-Dominance Lawsuits Targeting Exploitative 
Conduct 
  Also, as discussed 
below, the exclusion-focused paradigm as adopted by the AML 
leads to a mismatch between monopoly abuses that are prohibited 
under the AML and monopoly abuses that are most prevalent in 
China. 
Since the AML went into effect, the enforcement agencies 
charged with enforcing the AML’s abuse-of-dominance provisions, 
i.e., the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) 
and the NDRC, have not taken any enforcement action in this 
respect.  The slow pace of enforcement agencies in enforcing the 
AML, however, has not prevented aggrieved firms and citizen 
activists from seeking redress in the courts.231
 
228 Id. art. 6 (emphasis added). 
  In the AML’s first 
two years, Chinese media reported that the courts accepted five 
229 This inconsistency appears to be an oversight, not a deliberate choice, on 
the part of the drafters of the AML. 
230 See supra Part 2.4. (discussing market-entry restrictions in China). 
231 See AML, supra note 10, art. 50 (showing that the AML allows a private 
right of action: “Undertakings that are engaged in monopolistic conduct and 
cause damages to other parties assume civil liabilities in accordance with law.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss2/5
ZHENG.DOC 1/13/2011 6:47 PM 
2010] TRANSPLANTING ANTITRUST IN CHINA 697 
lawsuits alleging abuse-of-dominance violations for 
adjudication.232
Of the five lawsuits, three involved the so-called “monopoly 
industries,” i.e., industries where SOEs are dominant and entry by 
non-SOEs is generally prohibited by the government.
 
233  The fact 
that private abuse-of-dominance lawsuits targeted the monopoly 
industries is not surprising.  As discussed earlier, low levels of 
concentration generally characterize the market structure in most 
of China’s “competitive industries.”234  With few exceptions, those 
industries tend not to produce dominant firms.235
That the AML’s abuse-of-dominance provisions would raise 
questions about SOE monopolies was clearly something 
anticipated by the drafters of the AML, as the AML contains one 
provision specifically about the treatment of SOE monopolies.  
That provision, however, is remarkably ambiguous, and is perhaps 
intended to be so.  In Article 7, the AML provides, in relevant part, 
that “in SOE-dominated industries concerning the health of 
national economy and national security, and in industries where 
state trading is authorized by law, the lawful operations of the 
undertakings are protected by the state.”
  It is the largest 
SOEs in the monopoly industries that come closest to possessing 
what is referred to as “dominant market position” under the AML.  
236  This provision 
prompted observations that SOE monopolies are more or less 
exempted from the AML.237
 
232 There may be even more abuse-of-dominance lawsuits filed and accepted 
by the courts but not reported by the media.  Since there is no reliable case 
reporting system in China, the exact number of such lawsuits is unknown. 
  But although smacking rather 
strongly of an exemption, technically Article 7 could be read either 
way, depending on the exact meaning of the word “lawful” in the 
sentence “the lawful operations of the undertakings are protected 
by the state.”  If “lawful” means lawful under laws other than the 
AML, then the AML effectively grants a blanket exemption for 
233 See supra Part 2.5 (discussing China’s SOE reform strategy between the 
1970’s and the 1990’s). 
234 Supra Part 2.3. 
235 See Baidu Forecast Beats Estimates as Rival Good Fades, BLOOMBERG, Jul. 22 
2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-22/baidu-forecast-beats-
estimates-as-rival-google-fades.html (observing that one exception is China’s 
Internet search market, where China’s No. 1 search engine company, Baidu, had a 
market share of 70.8 percent by revenue). 
236 AML, supra note 10, art. 7. 
237 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 18, at 178 (“[D]ominant SOEs . . . in strategic 
sectors are all but exempted from the prohibitions of the AML.”). 
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SOE monopolies.  But if “lawful” means lawful under laws 
including the AML, then there will not be an exemption for SOE 
monopolies, and Article 7 will only serve as a reminder that SOE 
monopolies must comply with the AML, too.  But from the text of 
Article 7 alone, there is no way to tell which interpretation is 
correct. 
Despite the ambiguity of Article 7, Chinese plaintiffs 
challenged SOE monopolies in courts anyway.  But in contrast to 
the focus of the AML’s abuse-of-dominance provisions on 
exclusionary conduct, the conduct challenged under those lawsuits 
has all been exploitative in nature.  One of such lawsuits, for 
example, was filed against a local branch of China Construction 
Bank, one of China’s “big four” state-owned commercial banks, in 
the southwestern city of Chongqing.238  The plaintiff was a 
business that had a bank account with the defendant.  The 
defendant charged an “account management fee” for all accounts 
with deposits less than a certain amount, and the plaintiff’s 
account was assessed such a fee.  The plaintiff refused to pay the 
fee, believing that it was unreasonable.  When the plaintiff tried to 
withdraw funds from its account, the defendant refused to honor 
the withdrawal, citing non-payment of the account management 
fee as the reason.  The plaintiff sued the defendant in court, 
alleging that the defendant violated Article 17(3) of the AML for 
“refusal to deal” with the plaintiff and Article 17(6) of the AML for 
“discriminatory treatment of equally situated transaction 
counterparties.”239  The banking community in Chongqing was 
reportedly “shocked” by the court’s acceptance of the suit, and 
“actively communicated and coordinated” with the plaintiff and 
finally reached a settlement with the plaintiff.240
But it is not clear whether the defendant’s conduct was even 
covered under the AML.  According to Article 6 of the AML, 
conduct, perhaps with the exception of excessive pricing, 
constitutes an abuse of dominance only if it “excludes or impedes 
 
 
238 See Junhua Hu, Yinhangye Fanlongduan Diyi An: Zhongguo Jianshe Yinhang 
Qiangzhi Shoufei Cheng Beigao [First Antimonopoly Lawsuit in Banking Industry: China 
Construction Bank Sued for Mandatory Fees], Meiri Jingji Xinwen [DAILY ECON. 
NEWS], Sept. 12, 2008, http://active.zgjrw.com/News/2008912/zgjrw 
/260083051100.html.  
239 Id. 
240 See Zuigaoyuan Yantao Fanlongduan Minshi Susong [Supreme People’s Court 
Looking Into Antimonopoly Civil Litigation], Oct. 29, 2008, http://user.qzone.qq.com 
/17150205/blog/1225256456. 
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competition.”    The alleged “refusal to deal” by the defendant, 
however, was exploitative, not exclusionary.  It exploited the 
plaintiff, but did not exclude any of the defendant’s competitors.  
In other words, the alleged conduct of the defendant was “refusal 
to deal,” but probably not the kind of “refusal to deal” 
contemplated under Articles 6 and 17(3) of the AML.  The analysis 
of the plaintiff’s “discriminatory treatment” claim is similar.  The 
alleged “discriminatory treatment” by the defendant had no 
exclusionary effects, as it did not exclude competition between the 
defendant and its competitors.  Nor did it exclude competition 
among the defendant’s customers, as there was no evidence that 
the plaintiff was in a competitive relationship with owners of 
accounts that were waived the fee.241
The plaintiffs in the other two lawsuits involving SOE 
monopolies also targeted exploitative, not exclusionary, conduct.  
The defendants in those two lawsuits, China Netcom and China 
Mobile, were China’s two major telecommunications carriers.
  The alleged “discriminatory 
treatment,” again, was exploitative only. 
242  In 
the lawsuit against China Netcom, the plaintiff, an individual 
subscriber of the defendant, alleged that the defendant offered 
discount packages only to subscribers with a Beijing certificate of 
residence (hukou),243 thereby violating the AML’s prohibition of 
“discriminatory treatment of equally situated transaction 
counterparties” under Article 17(6).244
 
241 Even if the plaintiff were in a competitive relationship with owners of 
accounts that were waived the fee, this “secondary line” injury to competition is 
still exploitative in nature.  See POSNER, supra note 220, at 41 (arguing that some 
practices that seem exclusionary, such as price discrimination, are not indeed 
exclusionary). 
  In the lawsuit against China 
242 See infra note 251 (discussing China’s restructuring of its 
telecommunications industry, which led to the creation of China Netcom and 
China Mobile). 
243 China’s hukou system was originally introduced in the 1950s as a 
population management tool.  Under the system, each person was assigned either 
agricultural or non-agricultural status.  Non-agricultural hukou holders had broad 
access to urban employment and subsidized housing and public services such as 
education, health care, and transportation.  In recent years, although the 
constraints of hukou have gradually loosened, the requirements of hukou are still 
quite burdensome.  See OECD, OECD RURAL POLICY REVIEWS: CHINA 79–80 (2009) 
(discussing the hukou system, its reforms, and the subsequent effect on China and 
her citizens). 
244 See Xiaofang Ma, Lüshi Su Beijing Wangtong Weifan Fanlongduan Fa Zuo 
Zhengshi Li’an [Court Officially Accepts Antimonopoly Lawsuit Against Beijing China 
Netcom by Attorney], DIYI CAIJING RIBAO [FIRST BUSINESS DAILY] (Sept. 17, 2008), 
http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2008-09-17/02502459506.shtml (discussing a lawsuit 
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Mobile, the plaintiff, again an individual subscriber of the 
defendant, alleged that the defendant violated Article 17(6) of the 
AML by charging a monthly fixed fee to mobile subscribers using 
its global roaming services, but not to other subscribers.245  As in 
the lawsuit against China Construction Bank, the alleged conduct 
in these two lawsuits was only exploitative, not exclusionary.  It 
did force the plaintiffs to pay a higher fee than they otherwise 
would pay, but did not cause the kind of competitive injury 
contemplated under Article 6 of the AML.246
3.2.2. The Inadequacy of the AML’s Exclusion-Focused Paradigm 
 
That all of the abuses challenged by private plaintiffs in 
lawsuits involving China’s monopoly industries were exploitative 
ones is not purely accidental.  For there to be exclusionary abuses, 
there must be competitors or at least potential competitors that, but 
for antitrust intervention, would be excluded.  But this condition is 
to varying degrees not satisfied in China’s monopoly industries, 
where the state tightly controls the number of incumbent firms as 
well as market entry by new firms.  In an extreme scenario, where 
the state allows only one firm in an industry and strictly prohibits 
entry by others, that industry will not see any exclusionary 
conduct within the meaning of antitrust law, because, with the 
exclusion of competitors and potential competitors already done 
by the state, the monopoly firm will not need to resort to 
exclusionary conduct itself.  The absence of exclusionary conduct, 
however, does not mean that such industry is competitive.  Indeed, 
such industry is a monopoly industry in the ultimate sense, with 
 
brought against Beijing China Netcom for alleged unlawful treatment of prepaid 
telephone users in violation of antitrust laws). 
245 See Fayuan Shouli Zhongguo Yidong Beisu Longduan An [Court Accepts 
Antimonopoly Lawsuit Against China Mobile], CAIJING WANG [BUSINESS & FINANCE 
NET], Mar. 31, 2009, http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-03-31/110130848.html 
(discussing lawsuit brought against China Mobile for abuse of a dominant market 
position and violation of anti-monopoly law).  
246 Despite the fact that the plaintiff’s claim probably was not supported by 
the AML, China Mobile settled the lawsuit with the plaintiff, agreeing to transfer 
the plaintiff to a mobile service that did not charge a monthly fixed fee.  
Zhongyidong Bei Su Longduan An Hejie; “Jiangli” Yuangao 1000 Yuan [Antimonopoly 
Lawsuit Against China Mobile Settled; Plaintiff “Awarded” 1000 Yuan], Oct. 27, 2009, 
http://www.lrn.cn/science/frontSciTech/200910/t20091027_425960.htm 
[hereinafter China Mobile Antimonopoly Settlement].  There have been no press 
reports of the disposition of the lawsuit against China Netcom, but it likely was 
settled as well. 
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the sole firm’s monopoly status guaranteed by the state.  In such 
single-monopoly industries, for antitrust law to even become 
relevant, competition must be first “created”—i.e., by breaking up 
the state-sanctioned monopoly and/or allowing the possibility of 
entry by new firms.247
To be sure, most of China’s monopoly industries today have 
evolved away from this “single monopoly” model.
 
248  Thanks to 
the government’s past efforts to break up single monopolies 
through reshuffling SOE assets, the market structure in most of 
China’s monopoly industries is an oligopoly, with three or more 
large SOEs controlling the market.249  The breakup of single 
monopolies in the monopoly industries stood in contrast with the 
general trend towards greater consolidation of SOEs,250 and 
signaled the government’s intention to “create” competition in 
those industries.  As a matter of fact, the defendants in two of the 
three abuse-of-dominance lawsuits so far, China Netcom and 
China Mobile, were themselves outcomes of the breakup of the 
single monopoly, China Telecom, in the telecommunications 
industry.251
 
247 One commentator has previously noted, without elaboration, the need for 
transitional economies to create competition as opposed to merely maintaining it.  
See Song, supra note 117, at 387–88 (“Unlike market economies, however, 
transitional economies face the task of creating, not simply maintaining, 
competitive markets.”). 
  The government-initiated efforts to create competition 
248 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text (observing that the only 
monopoly industry that fits this “single monopoly” model is the railroad 
industry, where all of the operating assets are owned and managed by the 
Ministry of Railroads). 
249 For one particular monopoly industry—the airline industry—the name 
“monopoly industry” has indeed become a misnomer because of the intense 
competition in the industry.  Prior to its restructuring in 2001, China’s airline 
industry was crowded with regional SOE airlines funded by local governments.  
In 2001, China consolidated ten top airline companies into three major airline 
groups headed by Air China (including Air China, China Southwest, and 
Zhejiang Airline), China Eastern (including China Eastern, China Northwest, and 
Great Wall Airlines), and China Southern (China Southern, China Northern, 
China Xinjiang, and China Yunnan).  See Alev M. Efendioglu, The Airline Industry 
in China: Evolution and Competitive Dynamics, in CHINESE ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
AND INTERNATIONAL MARKETING STRATEGY 213 (Ilan Alon ed., 2003). 
250 For China’s efforts to consolidate SOEs in the reform era, see supra Part 
2.4. 
251 Prior to 1994, China’s telecommunications market was monopolized by 
China Telecom, an arm of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.  In 1994, 
the government formed two new carriers, China Unicom, and China Jitong, to 
compete with China Telecom.  In 2000, the government broke up China Telecom 
into four separate companies.  Under the 2000 restructuring, the landline services 
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in the monopoly industries, however, have not always achieved 
the intended outcomes.  In the past, the breakup of single 
monopolies into separate entities in the monopoly industries was 
predominantly along functional or geographical lines, which often 
resulted in new “single monopolies” in particular functions or 
geographical regions.  The restructuring of the telecommunications 
industry prior to 2008, for example, was mostly along functional 
and geographical lines.252  Although the 2008 telecommunications 
restructuring was originally intended to consolidate six carriers 
into three that would be better able to compete against one another 
across functions on a nationwide basis, a March 2009 notice from 
MIIT re-divided the nationwide landline market into two mutually 
exclusive territories, and assigned the two territories to two of the 
three carriers.253
 
of China Telecom were retained by China Telecom.  The mobile services of China 
Telecom were separated into a new company, China Mobile.  Another new 
company, China Netcom, was formed to build and operate a broadband data 
transmission network and to provide internet services.  Yet another new 
company, China Satellite, was formed to provide satellite communications 
services.  In addition, China Unicom was allowed to take over China Telecom’s 
mobile paging operations, and a new landline carrier, China Railcom, was formed 
by transferring to it the telephony network built by the Ministry of Railroads 
along China’s rail networks.  In 2002, China’s telecommunications industry 
underwent another reshuffle.  China Telecom, already slimmed down in 2000, 
was further divided into two parts: China Telecom Northern and China Telecom 
Southern.  China Telecom Northern was merged into China Netcom, while China 
Telecom Southern became the new China Telecom.  See Grace Li, Can the PRC’s 
New Anti-Monopoly Law Stop Monopolistic Activities: Let the PRC’s 
Telecommunications Industry Tell You the Answer, 33 TELECOMM. POL’Y 360, 361–62 
(2009) (describing the breaking up of China Telecom’s four divisions of services).  
In 2008, China’s telecommunications industry saw one more round of 
restructuring.  Under the 2008 restructuring, China Telecom took over China 
Unicom’s CDMA mobile network and China Satellite’s basic telecommunications 
business, China Unicom took over China Netcom, and China Mobile took over 
China Railcom.  Id. at 365–66. 
  In the electricity industry, another monopoly 
industry, the breakup of the dominant SOE was along functional 
252 See id. at 261.  
253 Under the MIIT notice, China Unicom was assigned ten provinces and 
provincial-level cities in northern China and the province of Sichuan and the city 
of Chongqing in southern China, while China Telecom was assigned twenty 
provinces and provincial-level cities in southern China and the city of Beijing in 
northern China.  See Gongxinbu Huading Yunyingshang Jingying Fanwei; Dianxin 
Liantong “Geju” Nanbei [MIIT Divides Business Territories for Carriers; China Telecom 
and China Unicom Assigned Southern and Northern China Respectively], GUANGZHOU 
RIBAO [GUANGZHOU DAILY], Mar. 18, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com 
/fortune/2009-03/18/content_11029184.htm.  
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and geographical lines as well.254  As a result, the amount of 
competition introduced in the monopoly industries is still fairly 
limited.255
Further exacerbating the exploitative abuses in the monopoly 
industries are the market entry restrictions in those industries.  
Under conventional antitrust theory, the threat of entry serves as a 
curb on a dominant firm’s exploitative conduct.
 
256
3.2.3. The AML as a Compensation for Regulatory Failure and 
Regulatory Capture 
  In state-
controlled industries, however, this curb is generally missing.  
Without much competitive pressure, dominant firms in many of 
the monopoly industries could afford to exploit consumers, very 
often with impunity from market discipline.  An antitrust law that 
focuses on exclusionary conduct, therefore, will be left powerless 
to address these exploitative abuses that harm consumers in a 
more direct way than exclusionary abuses. 
The fact that there is a need for enforcement against 
exploitative abuses, however, does not necessarily mean that such 
 
254 In 2002, the government broke up the State Power Corporation into two 
parts:  power generation and grids.  Together with the assets of the pre-existing 
Huaneng Group, the power generation assets of the State Power Corporation 
were assigned to five regional power generation companies:  China Huaneng 
Power Group, China Datang Corporation, China Huadian Corporation, China 
Guodian Corporation, and China Power Investment Corporation.  The 
transmission and distribution assets of the State Power Corporation were divided 
between two new companies, again along geographical lines: the State Grid 
Corporation was to own and operate the majority of regional grids in the country, 
while the Southern China Power Grid Company took over assets in the far south 
of the country in Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hainan.  See 
OECD, supra note 107, at 235–36. 
255 Sometimes, the government’s efforts to create competition in the 
monopoly industries were thwarted by collusion among SOEs to not compete 
against one another.  Take the telecommunications industry for example again.  In 
2007, China Netcom (with its main assets in northern China) and China Telecom 
(with its main assets in southern China) signed an agreement not to compete for 
landline business in each other’s territory.  See Dianxin Wangtong Qianshu “Junzi 
Xieyi,” Shuangfang Chengnuo Hubu Qinfan [China Telecom and China Netcom Sign 
“Gentleman’s Agreement,” Promise Mutual Non-Agression], Feb. 27, 2007, 
http://it.people.com.cn/GB/8219/78671/78672/5421402.html (describing the 
agreement between Telecom and China Netcom).  
256 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 
1979) (“[A]lthough a monopolist may be  expected to charge a somewhat higher 
price than would prevail in a competitive market, there is probably no better way 
for it to guarantee that its dominance will be challenged than by greedily 
extracting the highest price it can.”). 
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enforcement should be carried out under the authority of antitrust.  
An enforcement policy directed at purely exploitative conduct 
would almost inevitably require the scrutiny of the terms, 
particularly the price terms, of the transactions of dominant firms, 
turning antitrust authorities or courts into a price regulator.257  
Aside from the practical problem of how to identify appropriate 
price levels,258 antitrust authorities are generally reluctant to 
assume a role that is considered “the antithesis of the free 
market.”259  For these reasons, the consensus appears to be that 
price regulation is better restricted to situations of natural or legal 
monopoly, and should be carried out by industry regulators in the 
form of ex ante regulation.260
 
257 See Akman, supra note 223, at 33 (explaining the problems with remedies 
in an enforcement policy directed solely at exploitation). 
 
258 A good illustration of this practical problem is the EC Commission’s 
experience in determining what constituted “excessive pricing” in United Brands.  
In that case, the Commission condemned UBC for charging excessive prices for 
Chiquita bananas in Germany, Denmark, and Benelux.  To ascertain what the 
Chiquita prices might have been in a more competitive market, the Commission 
looked to prices of unbranded bananas, prices of competitors’ bananas, and prices 
of Chiquita bananas in Ireland.  It determined that the prices being investigated 
were “excessive in relation to the economic value of the product supplied.”  The 
Commission’s decision that unfair prices were charged was later annulled by the 
European Court of Justice.  See ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION 
LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 586 (3d ed. 2008).   
259 Id.  This sentiment is shared by courts and enforcement agencies in most 
countries.  In the United States, for example, Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit 
declared in Eastman Kodak that “judicial oversight of pricing policies would place 
the courts in a role akin to that of a public regulatory commission” and “[w]e 
would be wise to decline that function unless Congress clearly bestows it upon 
us.”  Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (1979).  Even 
countries that had extensive experience with price control are reluctant to have 
competition authorities assume the role of a price regulator.  In Mexico, for 
example, the Federal Law of Economic Competition, which replaced another law 
that granted extensive authority for price control, does not prohibit exploitative 
abuses at all.  One reason for this non-prohibition of exploitative abuses in Mexico 
is the belief that competition authorities should not be turned into a price 
regulator.  See Adriaan ten Kate & Gunnar Niels, Mexico’s Competition Law: North 
American Origins, European Practice, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN TRANS-ATLANTIC 
ANTITRUST 721 (Philip Marsden ed. 2006) (“This decision to abstain from 
prohibiting exploitative abuses of dominant positions seems to have been taken 
deliberately, in recognition of the fact that market may not only reflect a lack of 
competition today but could have been obtained as a result of fierce competition 
in the past.”). 
260 See JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 258, at 586 (noting that price regulation, in 
certain circumstances, may be a disincentive for competition, but where natural or 
legal monopolies exist, price regulation may be effective).  
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However, what muddles the picture in China is that its 
monopoly industries are indeed subject to the ex ante regulation of 
industry regulators.  As discussed earlier, almost all of China’s 
monopoly industries are those in which the government has 
retained its regulatory apparatus.261
That the courts were called upon to regulate prices in the 
monopoly industries underscores the problems with China’s 
regulatory process in those industries.  As discussed earlier, 
although the intent of China’s regulatory reforms in the monopoly 
industries was to forge “independent” industry regulators, there 
are still no institutional guarantees of the impartiality of the 
regulators.
  Indeed, all of the defendants 
in the three abuse-of-dominance lawsuits discussed above had an 
industry regulator:  China Construction Bank by the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (“CBRC”) and China Netcom 
and China Mobile by the MIIT.  Therefore, the real question posed 
by the three abuse-of-dominance lawsuits is not whether 
exploitative abuses in those industries should be regulated, but by 
whom they should be regulated.  Considered in this light, what the 
plaintiffs in the three abuse-of-dominance lawsuits were trying to 
accomplish was essentially to have the courts take over the 
responsibilities for setting prices from the industry regulators. 
262  The regulators of the monopoly industries are still 
vulnerable to various forms of regulatory failure and regulatory 
capture.  The industry regulators often fail to regulate a conduct 
that is patently exploitative or, in the event that they do regulate, 
they often regulate in a way that tends to perpetuate, rather than 
correct, exploitative conduct.  Examples of regulatory failure and 
regulatory capture can be found by looking no further than the 
three abuse-of-dominance lawsuits discussed above.  The China 
Construction Bank case appears to provide an example of 
regulatory failure.  The conduct challenged in that case—the 
charging of an “account management fee” for small accounts—is 
one of the banking industry’s common practices that is widely 
viewed by the public as unreasonable.263
 
261 See supra Part 2.6. 
  Yet under a regulation 
262 See id. 
263 The Chinese press reported in August 2010 that a Beijing resident was 
surprised to see that his one hundred yuan shrank to sixty yuan after nine years of 
being deposited in a bank.  See Shimin 100 Yuan Cun 9 Nian Jin Sheng 60 Yuan; 
Yinhang Shoufei Chao Lixi [Only 60 yuan Left of Resident’s 100-yuan Deposit; Bank Fee 
Higher Than Interest], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Aug. 12, 2010, 
http://news.163.com/10/0812/07/6DSANUP700011229.html; see also Gongzhong 
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issued by CBRC in 2003, most bank fees are subject to “market 
pricing,” i.e., they are not regulated by CBRC.264  Deregulation of 
bank fees might have been a right step had the banking industry 
been a competitive one, as market competition would reign in at 
least some of the unreasonable fees.  But given that China’s 
banking industry is still far from being competitive, the lack of 
effective regulation will undoubtedly contribute to exploitative 
abuses in the industry.265  The China Mobile case, by contrast, 
appears to provide an example of regulatory capture.  The conduct 
challenged in that case—the charging of a monthly fixed fee for 
phone services—was indeed a policy set by the industry 
regulator.266  The regulator’s action here may have made 
consumers worse off than if the regulator did not act.  Not only 
does this regulatory action legitimize what is widely viewed as 
exploitative conduct, but it preempts potential market competition 
that would otherwise chip away at the exploitative conduct.  This 
anticompetitive use of regulation has been very common in other 
countries267
 
Zui Fangan De Yinhang Shoufei Xiangmu: Xiaoe Guanlifei Ju Shou [Small-Account 
Management Fee Tops List of Bank Charges Most Disliked by Public], CHONGQING 
CHENBAO [CHONGQING MORNING DAILY], Aug. 20, 2010, http://bank.hexun 
.com/2010-08-20/124659978.html?from=rss (describing public sentiment towards 
account management fees).  
 and certainly poses a real danger to China’s regulated 
industries as well.  
264 See CBRC & NDRC, Shangye Yinhang Fuwu Jiage Guanli Zhanxing Banfa 
[Provisional Measures on Service Fees of Commercial Banks], June 26, 2003, 
http://www.jincao.com/fa/09/law09.41.htm (stating measures for commercial 
bank service fees). 
265 Since CBRC deregulated most bank fees in 2003, the number of fee items 
charged by Chinese banks increased from about 300 in 2003 to more than 3000 in 
2010.  See Yinhang Shoufei Xiangmu 3000 duo: Ruhe Dui Bu Heli Shoufei Shuo Bu? 
[More Than 3000 Bank Fee Items: How to Say “No” to Unreasonable Bank Fees?], Aug. 
6, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-08/06/c_12416381.htm 
(describing the proliferation of banking fees and the resulting consumer 
dissatisfaction).  It was reported that as of August 2010, NDRC and CBSC were 
drafting a new regulation on bank fees, which would outlaw seven unreasonable 
fee items.  But with only a few exceptions, the account management fee for small 
accounts would still be allowed under the proposed new regulation.  See Liang 
Buwei Qicao Yinhang Fuwu Jiage Banfa: 7 Xiang Shoufei Jiang Quxiao [Two Agencies 
Draft Regulatory Measures on Bank Fees: Seven Fee Items to be Prohibited], Aug. 10, 
2010, http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/12390049.html. 
266 In response to the plaintiff’s claim, China Mobile pointed to a number of 
government notices and measures dating back to 1994 that mandated the monthly 
fixed charge.  See China Mobile Antimonopoly Settlement, supra note 246. 
267 See Roger G. Noll, Regulatory Reform and International Trade Policy, in 
DEREGULATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 13, 39–40 
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So, given that there is not enough competition in China’s 
monopoly industries to rein in exploitative abuses and that the 
industry regulators often fail to regulate those abuses, the question 
that should be asked is:  should exploitative abuses be addressed 
under antitrust law instead?  A similar question was asked of 
natural monopoly industries of central and eastern European 
countries during the initial periods of those countries’ transition to 
a market economy in the early 1990s, when antitrust authorities 
were created before regulatory agencies overseeing the natural 
monopoly industries were created.  It was suggested back then that 
in areas where regulation was relatively straightforward or areas 
where regulation was deemed necessary only on a short-term basis 
as competitive forces develop in a particular sector, it might be 
advantageous to rely on antitrust authorities, rather than 
specialized industry regulators, to combat exploitative abuses.268  
But in China, with industry regulators in the monopoly industries 
already entrenched when antitrust authorities came on the scene, 
addressing exploitative abuses under antitrust law would 
necessarily require antitrust authorities to exercise power over 
industry regulators.  Such institutional arrangement might be 
feasible in an economy with a political structure based on rules of 
law,269 but is not an attractive option for a country like China that 
already suffers from governance deficiencies and inter-agency 
conflicts.270
 
(Takatoshi Ito & Anne O. Krueger eds., 2000) (describing competition policies in 
general and its use by various governments).  This anticompetitive use of 
regulation is one form of what is often termed “public restraints” in the antitrust 
literature.  See D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions 
that Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2009). 
  That might, at least partially, explain why the AML 
268 See Janusz A. Ordover, Russell W. Pittman & Paul Clyde, Competition 
Policy for Natural Monopolies in a Developing Market Economy, in DE-
MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION POLICY IN POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES 179 
(Ben Slay ed., 1996).  
269 See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST DIVISION 
MANUAL, V-5 (2009) http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual 
/chapter5.pdf (noting that in the United States, for example, federal antitrust 
authorities can intervene in proceedings of federal regulatory agencies to suggest 
adoption of the least anticompetitive and best-designed forms of regulation where 
continued regulation is deemed necessary); see also Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. 
Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T (1982), in THE 
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290 (John E. Kwoka Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989) 
(noting that antitrust authorities can also bring enforcement action against 
companies that use the regulatory process for anticompetitive purposes). 
270 For discussions of China’s inter-agency conflicts, see generally Randall 
Peerenboom, A Government of Laws: Democracy, Rule of Law, and Administrative Law 
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largely stayed away from exploitative abuses and focused on 
exclusionary abuses instead. 
It appears that in order to address exploitative abuses in the 
monopoly industries, the only viable option left for China is for the 
government to continue its efforts to “create” more competition in 
those industries through breaking up SOE monopolies and 
relaxing market entry restrictions—efforts that would take place 
outside of the framework of the AML, if at all.  Of course, if those 
efforts are successful and meaningful competition is introduced in 
those industries, those industries will see increasingly more 
exclusionary abuses.  But until then, the AML will have only 
limited relevance to abuse-of-dominance issues in those industries, 
and by extension, to abuse-of-dominance generally. 
3.3. Merger Review:  How Relevant Is It To Domestic Firms? 
As with antitrust laws in most jurisdictions, the AML provides 
a merger review regime—a regime in which parties to a proposed 
merger or “concentration” are required to notify the government of 
the proposed transaction and wait for government review of the 
likely effects of the transaction on competition before the 
transaction can be officially consummated.271  Prior to the AML, 
there was a merger review process for foreign companies seeking 
to acquire domestic Chinese companies,272 but there was not a 
corresponding merger review process for domestic mergers.  This 
was changed by the AML, at least in theory.  By virtue of applying 
to “monopoly conduct in economic activities within the People’s 
Republic of China,”273
Two years later, however, the AML appears not to have 
significantly changed China’s merger review landscape.  As of 
August 2010, the Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”), the agency 
charged with merger review, had rejected one proposed merger 
 the AML extends its merger review regime 
to domestic mergers as well. 
 
Reform in China, in DEBATING POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA: RULE OF LAW VS. 
DEMOCRATIZATION 58, 69 (Suisheng Zhao ed., 2006).  
271 Articles 20 through 31 of the AML detail the merger review regime under 
the AML.  See supra note 10. 
272 See Ministry of Commerce, Guanyu Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei Giye 
De Guiding [Provisions on Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors], 
Aug. 6, 2006, http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/zcfg/law_ch_info.jsp?docid 
=56103. 
273 AML, supra note 10, art. 2. 
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and approved six others with conditions since the AML went into 
effect.274  All seven transactions involved foreign companies, and 
six of them were transactions initiated overseas between 
multinational corporations that had operations in China.275  In 
terms of mergers notified to MOFCOM, foreign companies 
accounted for the majority of them as well.  According to statistics 
provided by MOFCOM, as of June 2009, of the fifty-eight mergers 
accepted by MOFCOM for review under the AML, forty involved 
multinational corporations.276  The more recent statistics on merger 
review cases, released by MOFCOM in August 2010 in a press 
conference, did not provide the exact number of notified mergers 
involving foreign companies, but a senior MOFCOM official stated 
at the press conference that “the majority of mergers accepted for 
review involved foreign companies.”277
The disproportionately high percentage of foreign companies 
involved in cases notified to MOFCOM and in cases for which 
MOFCOM published its merger review decisions has led to 
suspicions or charges that MOFCOM discriminated against foreign 
companies in its merger review process.
 
278
 
274 The one merger that was rejected by MOFCOM was Coca-Cola’s 
acquisition of Huiyuan Juice Co.  The six mergers that were approved by 
MOFCOM with conditions were the InBev/Anheuser-Busch, Mitsubishi 
Rayon/Lucite, GM/Delphi, Pfizer/Wyeth, Panasonic/Sanyo, and 
Novartis/Alcon mergers.  For MOFCOM’s merger decisions in these cases (in 
Chinese), see MOFCOM, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/ztxx/ztxx.html.  
  But whether MOFCOM 
discriminates against foreign firms in its merger review process, 
although a legitimate question, is less important than the extent to 
which the AML is capable of reaching firms other than foreign 
firms in the first place.  For reasons to be discussed below, the 
answer to the latter question is:  not too much, at least presently. 
275 The InBev/Anheuser-Busch, Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite, GM/Delphi, 
Pfizer/Wyeth, Panasonic/Sanyo, and Novartis/Alcon mergers all belong to this 
category.  Of the seven transactions, only the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan transaction 
involved a domestic Chinese company. 
276 See Fanlongduan Fa Shishi Yinian: Kuaguo Gongsi Canyu Anjia Zhan 69% 
[Antimonopoly Law One Year On: Multinational Corporations Involved in Sixty-Nine 
Percent of Cases], Nov. 17, 2009, http://www.fclaw.com.cn/Details.asp?id=13994. 
277 See Liu Ling, Shangwubu: Fanlongduan Shencha Wei Qishi Qaizi [MOFCOM: 
No Discrimination Against Foreign Companies in Antimonopoly Merger Review], 
MORNING POST, Aug. 12, 2010, http://www.morningpost.com.cn/xwzx/jjxw 
/2010-08-12/66994.shtml. 
278 It appears that MOFCOM’s August 2010 press conference was called 
primarily as a response to the discrimination charges. 
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3.3.1. Market Structure and Merger Review 
The first reason the AML’s merger review process has not 
involved many domestic firms is none other than the market 
structures of China’s industries.  As discussed earlier, most of 
China’s industries, with the exception of the monopoly industries, 
are characterized by small-scale firms and low market 
concentration ratios.279  Mergers among small firms in non-
concentrated markets hardly pose threats to competition, and a 
merger review process that aims to prevent only mergers that have 
anticompetitive effects typically does not, and should not, reach 
those mergers.  Indeed, in the mid 1990s, when a merger control 
regime was not in place in China, the consensus among policy 
experts and scholars appeared to be that the concentration of 
economic power was “not a major issue, at present”280 and that the 
lack of merger controls was “not alarming from the point of view 
of antitrust law.”281  With the further decentralization of most of 
China’s industries after the 1990s, fueled mostly by duplicate 
investment by local governments,282
3.3.2. SOEs and Merger Review:  Conceptual Issues 
 it appears that those 
assessments would still hold by the time the AML was enacted. 
The second reason the AML’s merger review process has only 
had limited relevance to domestic firms has to do with the 
treatment of SOE mergers.  Despite low market concentration 
ratios in most of China’s industries, there are large firms in China 
whose sizes reach or exceed the AML’s notification thresholds.  
Those firms are mostly SOEs, many of which are in the monopoly 
industries.283
Indeed, after the AML went into effect in 2008, there was a 
“tidal wave” of SOE mergers, as described by the Chinese 
media.
 
284
 
279 See supra Part 2.3. 
  Mergers among China’s largest SOEs, i.e., SOEs 
280 INTERNAL MARKET, supra note 29, at 134.  But see OECD, supra note 48, at 
403–04 (offering an opposing view that China’s low market concentration ratios 
were not an accurate indicator of the competitiveness of China’s industries).  
281 Song, supra note 117, at 399. 
282 See supra Part 2.2.  
283 See supra Part 2.5. 
284 See, e.g., Guoyou Qiye Xin Yi Lun Binggou Chongzu Dachao Lailin [The Advent 
of the Tidal Wave of a New Round of SOE Mergers and Acquisitions and Restructuring], 
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supervised by the central government or “central SOEs,” have been 
particularly active.  Since the AML went into effect, the number of 
central SOEs directly supervised by SASAC has been reduced from 
149 in August 2008 to 123 in August 2010, mostly through SASAC-
initiated mergers.285  Mergers among SOEs supervised by local 
governments, or “local SOEs,” and mergers between central and 
local SOEs, have also been increasing since the beginning of 
2009.286
So, are mergers among large SOEs being notified to MOFCOM 
for merger review?  The answer to that question has been evasive 
so far.  Since MOFCOM does not disclose the identities of the 
parties to a merger notified to it unless it rejects or attaches 
conditions to the merger, there is no practical way to know, among 
the SOEs that went through a merger after the AML went into 
effect, who filed a merger notification and who did not.
 
287  
MOFCOM’s official position regarding this question is that “all 
mergers whose size reach a certain threshold should be notified, as 
long as the mergers are among market entities.”288
 
SHANGHAI SEC. NEWS, Feb. 25, 2009, http://news.cnfol.com/090225/101,1277 
,5501333,00.shtml. 
  But that is not 
always the way SOE mergers have proceeded.  In the case of the 
mergers among central SOEs, for example, it appears that none 
underwent MOFCOM review, as the press releases put out by 
SASAC announcing the consummation of those mergers all listed 
“the State Council” as the only government authority that 
285 For a listing of mergers among central SOEs, see [State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council], SASAC, 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2665/index.html. 
286 See Jin Jiang Qi, 12 Shengshi Guli Zhenghe Shangshi Gongsi; Difang Guoqi Re 
Pan Duijie Yangqi [Twelve Provinces and Cities Encourage Mergers Among Publicly 
Listed Companies; Local SOEs Eagerly Awaits Mergers with Central SOEs], Jan. 17, 
2009, http://stock.jrj.com.cn/2009/01/1707173368126.shtml. 
287 It was reported by the Chinese press that in May 2009, a lawyer-activist 
once requested, pursuant to China’s Government Open Information Law, that 
MOFCOM disclose all materials relating to its review of the China Netcom/China 
Unicom merger.  The response he received from MOFCOM was that the AML 
does not require it to disclose information about individual cases.  See Xiangdong 
Zhang, Fanloongduan: Yige Ren De Zhanzheng [Antimonopoly: A War of One Person], 
JINGJI GUANCHA BAO [ECON. OBSERVER J.], Nov. 22, 2009, http://www.eeo.com.cn 
/Politics/beijing_news/2009/11/21/156314.shtml.  
288 See Gengyan Bing & Xie Wenxing, Shangwubu: Fanlongduan Bingfei Fan 
Waiqi [MOFCOM: Antimonopoly Not Anti-Foreign Firms], GUANDONG NEWSPAPER, 
Aug. 12, 2010, http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2010-8-
13/zNMDAwMDE5MTkzNA.html (quoting Ming Shang, Director-General of the 
Antimonopoly Bureau of MOFCOM). 
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approved the mergers.289  However, in at least one merger between 
a central SOE and a local SOE, i.e., the merger between China 
Eastern Airlines and Shanghai Airlines in 2009, it was reported that 
clearance from MOFCOM was obtained prior to the merger.290
No matter whether SOE mergers are as a matter of fact being 
notified to MOFCOM, there appears to be a consensus that such 
notifications are required by the AML.
 
291  But that conclusion is at 
least debatable, from both a textual and a conceptual point of view.  
From a textual point of view, leaving aside the question of whether 
Article 7 exempts SOEs in the monopoly industries from the AML 
altogether,292 it could be argued that Article 22(2) of the AML 
almost, if not indeed, explicitly exempts all SOEs from the AML’s 
merger notification requirement.  Article 22(2) provides that a 
merger need not be notified if “more than fifty percent of the 
voting shares of each of the undertakings to the merger are owned 
by a common undertaking that is not a party to the merger.”293  
“Undertakings,” in turn, are defined under the AML as “natural 
persons, legal persons, or other organizations that engage in the 
production and distribution of products or the provision of 
services.”294
Setting aside this textual ambiguity, subjecting SOE mergers to 
merger review would be problematic from a conceptual point of 
  Apparently, Article 22(2) is intended to exempt 
mergers among subsidiaries of a common shareholder from the 
notification requirement.  But technically speaking, are not all 
SOEs “subsidiaries” of a common shareholder, i.e., the state?  
Given that the state still retains an active role in the production and 
distribution of products or the provision of services (mostly 
through SOEs, but not always), it might not be entirely nonsensical 
to argue that the state itself should be considered an “undertaking” 
within the meaning of the AML. 
 
289 The press releases (in Chinese) can be found at Press Releases, SASAC, 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2665/index.html (last visited Jan. 7, 
2011). 
290 Han Zhe, Donghang Shanghang Hebing Huo Zhengjianhui Tongguo; Chongzu 
Zhengfu Shenpi Quanbu Guoguan [CSRC Approves Eastern-Shanghai Merger; All 
Government Approvals Received], BEIJING SHANGBAO [BEIJING BUS. NEWS], Dec. 1, 
2009, http://news.hexun.com/2009-12-01/121864153.html.  
291 See Zhang, supra note 287. 
292 For discussions of the ambiguity of Article 7, see supra notes 236–37 and 
accompanying text. 
293 AML, supra note 10, art. 22(2). 
294 Id. art. 12. 
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view as well.  If a merger among private firms that are subsidiaries 
of a common parent should be exempted from the merger 
notification requirement, why should a merger among SOEs that 
are also owned by one common parent, i.e., the state, not be 
exempted, too?  One plausible answer to this question appears to 
be that there is an implicit assumption in exempting mergers 
among subsidiaries of private firms from merger review, and that 
assumption is that such subsidiaries are not in a competitive 
relationship with one another.  Such assumption does not hold, the 
answer would go, for China’s SOEs that are, or are at least 
intended to be, competitors of one another. 
This answer, while intuitive, actually underscores the 
paradoxical nature of China’s SOEs.  In a continuum between a 
pure state entity on one end and a pure market entity on the other, 
China’s SOEs appear in the middle—perhaps closer to the market 
entity end, but not quite there yet.  They have moved far enough in 
the process of becoming market entities to be in a competitive 
relationship with one another, but have not moved far enough in 
that process to be completely independent of state control.  So 
when the state merges two SOEs, to what extent is that merger an 
“economic activity”295
The last question merits asking because, although many SOE 
mergers in China so far have involved the making of payments for 
equity stakes or assets,
 that should be subject to the AML?  Does the 
answer to that question depend on whether the SOE merger takes 
the form of a market transaction? 
296
 
295 See id. art. 2 (providing that only “economic activities” are subject to the 
AML). 
 there are SOE mergers that do not 
involve anything even remotely resembling a market transaction.  
In February 2009, in an effort to expedite the consolidation of 
central SOEs and to reduce the number of management layers that 
would otherwise result from the consolidation, SASAC issued a 
guidance document on the “gratuitous transfer,” or transfer 
without payment (wuchang huazhuan), of SOE equity stakes among 
296 For example, when China Telecom acquired the CDMA network of China 
Unicom in June 2008, the former paid the latter a total sum of one hundred and 
ten billion yuans.  See Zhongguo Dianxin Aongjia 1100 Yi Shougou Liantong C Wang 
[China Telecom Acquires C-Network of China Unicom with a Total Sum of 110 Billion 
Yuans], SINA, June 2, 2008, http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2008-06-02/16362231328 
.shtml.  Obviously, the payment was made necessary in part because both China 
Telecom and China Unicom have subsidiaries whose stocks are listed on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange.  For discussions of the 2008 restructuring of the 
telecommunications industry, see supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
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central SOEs.297
3.3.3. SOEs and Merger Review:  Policy Tensions 
  Should SOE mergers accomplished through such 
gratuitous transfers be exempted from the AML’s notification 
requirement now that such mergers do not resemble conventional 
mergers anymore?  If the answer to this question is in the 
affirmative, then where is the line to be drawn between SOE 
mergers that should be considered “mergers” and SOE mergers 
that should not?  Not all of these questions yield simple answers. 
In addition to the conceptual issue discussed above, subjecting 
SOEs to merger review would also create tensions between 
competing policy goals.  China has long had a policy favoring SOE 
mergers, a policy that dates back to the early 1980s.298  As time 
went on, China appeared to keep adding new justifications for this 
policy.  Initially, beginning in the early 1980s, SOE mergers were 
intended primarily as a response to low market concentration and 
market segmentation across provinces.299  Beginning in the early 
1990s, along with the need to address market segmentation, the 
government’s strategic repositioning of SOEs in the national 
economy—a strategy referred to as “grasp the large, let go of the 
small”—became a major factor driving SOE mergers.300
 
297 See SASAC, Qiye Guoyou Chanquan Wuchang Huazhuan Gongzuo Zhiyin 
[Guidance on the Gratuitous Transfer of State-Owned Equity Rights in Enterprises], Feb. 
26, 2009, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-02/24/content_1240882.htm (listing of 
gratuitous transfer of state-owned property rights guidelines by SASAC). 
  Most 
recently, in addition to the need for addressing market 
segmentation and the need for carrying out the government’s 
overall SOE strategy, a third factor, i.e., the need for forming 
China’s “national champions,” appeared to have made its way to 
the expanding list of policy considerations favoring SOE mergers.  
This newest goal of SOE mergers was vividly on display in a 
strategic SOE consolidation plan issued by SASAC in December 
2006, in which SASAC vowed to maintain “absolute control” by 
SOEs in seven industries and to form thirty to fifty “internationally 
298 See Song, supra note 117, at 397 (“The Chinese government realized in the 
early 1980s that low industrial concentration and market segmentation across 
provinces were causing economic inefficiency.  Since then, it has actively 
encouraged industrial combinations of various types, with state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) as leading firms.”).  
299 Id. 
300 See supra Part 2.5.  
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competitive” SOEs in those industries.301
In sum, what appeared to be one of the AML’s most significant 
breakthroughs—the creation of a merger review regime for 
domestic mergers—has not had a significant impact on domestic 
mergers, if any impact at all.  Before China’s industries become 
more concentrated, and before China reconciles its SOE policies 
with its merger control policy, the merger review process under 
the AML will likely remain a process largely focused on foreign 
companies. 
  All of the three policy 
goals driving SOE mergers appear to be at least equally important, 
if not more important, than the merger control goal of the AML.  
As a result, even if SOE mergers were indeed notified to 
MOFCOM, it would be exceedingly difficult for MOFCOM to 
exercise independent merger review to override these competing 
policy goals. 
4. WHY WAS THE AML ENACTED? 
A recurring pattern emerges from the analyses above:  despite 
having been widely regarded as a historic step for China, the AML 
has not yet become an integral part of China’s competition policy.  
The transitional stage that China is currently in, China’s market 
structures, and pervasive state control of China’s economy have 
limited the reach and applicability of the AML in all three major 
areas of antitrust:  cartels, abuse of dominant market position, and 
merger review. 
A question brought to the forefront by the above analyses is 
then this:  if the AML appears to be ill-suited to address the most 
pressing competition issues in China today, why was it enacted in 
the first place?  This question is a variant of the “original intent” 
question that was once asked of antitrust laws in other countries, 
such as the United States302 and Japan.303
 
301 See Owen et al., supra note 162, at 244. 
  Although plenty has 
On December 18, 2006, the State Assets Supervision and Management 
Commission announced that seven ‘strategic’ industries . . . will be 
controlled by SOEs.  The government aims to increase State capital in 
those seven industries and seeks to maintain ‘absolute control’ of them 
by SOEs.  The State Assets Supervision and Management Commission 
also announced that it is China’s goal to foster thirty to fifty large 
‘internationally competitive’ SOEs in those industries by 2010. 
Id. 
302 Many scholars in the United States, including Hans Thorelli, William 
Letwin, Robert Bork, John Flynn, and Robert Lande, have debated the original 
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been written about the drafting process of the AML304 and the 
driving forces behind the enactment of the AML,305
Short of having access to documentation of behind-the-scenes 
deliberations that eventually led to the consensus within the 
government on the need for a formal antitrust law, the 
identification of the original intent of the AML may never be 
completely accurate.  Nevertheless, publicly available information 
about the AML’s drafting process can, and does, provide 
important clues. 
 the question of 
the “original intent” of the AML has not yet been specifically asked 
and answered. 
As has been observed elsewhere, some of the driving forces 
behind the AML were the government’s desires to promote the 
development of the market and to contain abusive state power.306  
These “domestic incentives,” however, had not been strong,307
 
intent of U.S. antitrust law in general and the Sherman Act in particular.  See 
Harry First, Antitrust in Japan: The Original Intent, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 1–2 & 
nn.1–3 (2000) (arguing that while most Japanese sources assume Japan’s 
Antimonopoly Act to be an American invention and imposition on Japan, 
negotiators from Japan’s government not only understood the legislation but also 
drafted the statute that was finally enacted). 
 and 
certainly not strong enough to make the idea of enacting a formal 
antitrust law a quick sell.  It has been widely noted that the AML 
303 Drawing on the original Occupation document, Professor First challenged 
the conventional notion that Japanese antitrust law was improperly imposed on 
Japan by the United States by demonstrating that the government of Japan drafted 
the statute that was finally enacted and that its provisions reflected the success 
Japan’s negotiators had in achieving many of their goals.  See generally id. 
304 For discussions on the drafting process of the AML, see Wu, supra note 10, 
at 76–78 (describing the AML’s drafting process); Yong Huang, Pursuing the 
Second Best: The History, Momentum, and Remaining Issues of China’s Anti-Monopoly 
Law, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 117, 118–20 (2008) (detailing the long legislative history of 
the AML and the AML project’s sudden revival after a decade). 
305 For discussions of the driving forces behind the enactment of the AML, 
see Huang, supra note 304, at 120–24 (listing and discussing each of the driving 
forces behind the AML: the desire to establish a market economy, the desire to 
contain abusive state power, the desire to protect national interest, and the desire 
to narrow income disparity).  See generally David J. Gerber, Economics, Law & 
Institutions: The Shaping of Chinese Competition Law, 26 J.L. & POL’Y 271 (2008) 
(examining some of the factors that have influenced the shaping of the AML and 
that are likely to influence the operation of competition law and its institutions). 
306 See Huang, supra note 304 at 121–22. 
307 See Gerber, supra note 305, at 282 (“Domestic incentives to enact a 
competition law have not been strong, and there has been opposition to the idea 
within the government, but on balance they seem to have provided support for 
competition law.”). 
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was first placed on the government’s legislative agenda in 1994.308  
The efforts to draft an antimonopoly law, however, started much 
earlier, when a drafting team was first assembled under the 
Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council in 1987.309  The plan 
back then was to enact a “unitary” law that would combine an 
antimonopoly law and an anti-unfair competition law, and in 1988, 
the drafting team produced the first draft of a provisional rule 
following this unitary model.310  The draft provisional rule, 
however, was vetoed by the government after investigations by the 
State Economic and Trade Commission (“SETC”) and the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) into China’s 
market conditions led to the conclusion that “monopoly issues 
were neither typical nor widespread.”311  The drafting team then 
decided to bifurcate the drafting process for the antimonopoly law 
and the anti-unfair competition law, and, as a result, the Anti-
Unfair Competition Law was enacted in 1993.312  In 1994, the 
antimonopoly law was placed on the government’s legislative 
agenda and a new drafting team consisting of officials from SETC 
and SAIC was assembled again.313  The new drafting team did 
produce a draft of the antimonopoly law, but that draft was never 
introduced in the National People’s Congress.314  The drafting 
process for the AML then “languished for a decade,” and it was 
not until 2004 that the drafting efforts were “suddenly revived and 
expedited.”315
 
308 See, e.g., Huang, supra note 304, at 118 (“The drafting of the Chinese AML 
bill commenced in 1994, but it was not enacted until 2007.”); Wu, supra note 10, at 
76 (“It is well known that the AML was on the legislative agenda for the Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth National People’s Congresses.  Thirteen years have passed since 
1994, when the former State Economic & Trade Commission (SETC) was first 
responsible for the drafting of the AML.”). 
 
309 See Fanlongduan Fa 21 Nian Fengyu Licheng [The Antimonopoly Law’s Bumpy 
Journey of Twenty-One Years], ZHONGGUO JINGJI SHIBAO [CHINA ECON. TIMES], July 
29, 2008, http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=3984&cid=13 
[hereinafter AML’s Twenty-One Year Journey] (stating the former State Council 
Legislative Council set up a drafting group for the anti-monopoly law in August 
1987). 
310 Id. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. 
313 Id. 
314 Huang, supra note 304, at 118 n.3 (“Since 1994 the two drafters [the SETC 
and the SAIC] had produced a single, joint draft, but for various reasons it had 
never been introduced in the NPC.”). 
315 Id. at 120; see also AML’s Twenty-One Year Journey, supra note 309. 
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What happened?  Based on Chinese media reports, it was 
apparently a 2003 incident involving alleged anticompetitive 
practices of a foreign company in China that led to the sudden 
acceleration of the drafting process for the AML.  In 2003, Tetra 
Pak, a Swedish company specializing in aseptic packaging 
equipment and supplies for dairy and beverage products, was 
accused of tying the sale of packaging equipment to the sale of 
packaging supplies in China.316  After receiving complaints from 
domestic firms competing with Tetra Pak for packaging supplies, 
SAIC and MOFCOM conducted a series of investigations into 
anticompetitive conduct by foreign companies in China.317  In 
April 2004, SAIC reported the findings of its investigations in an 
internal publication.  In its report, SAIC gave detailed data on 
market shares of foreign companies in China in seven product 
groups or industries, and warned of a trend of foreign companies 
monopolizing the Chinese markets.318
It is important to bear in mind that the Tetra Pak incident and 
the ensuing investigations by SAIC and MOFCOM took place 
against the backdrop of a more globalized economy in the post-
WTO era.  Upon its accession to the WTO in 2001, China made a 
broad range of commitments, including commitments on tariff 
reductions and binding for a large number of products
 
319 and 
commitments on trade in services in a large number of sectors.320
 
316 See Ruidian Lile Shishi Kunbang Xiaoshou Zao Zhiyi [Swedish Tetra Pak’s 
Tying Practices Questioned], GUOJI JINRONG BAO [INT’L FIN. J.], Nov. 5, 2003, 
http://finance1.jrj.com.cn/news/2003-11-05/000000680733.html (discussing 
Tetra Pak’s bundling practices and their aseptic package marketing dominance); 
see also AML’s Twenty-One Year Journey, supra note 309.  
  
The direct outcomes of these WTO commitments are enhanced 
access to the Chinese market by foreign companies, from both 
317 See AML’s Twenty-One Year Journey, supra note 309.  
318 The seven product groups or industries included in the SAIC report were 
software, photosensitive materials, personal computers, cell phones, cameras, 
tires, soft drink packaging, retails, and beverages.  See Guojia Gongshang Zongju 
Baogao: Kuaguo Jutou Zai Hua Jian Xian Longduan Taishi [SAIC Report: Multinational 
Giants Show Signs of Monopolizing China’s Markets], XINWEN CHENBAO [NEWS 
MORNING DAILY], Nov. 15, 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2004-
11/15/content_2221465.htm.  
319 For discussions of China’s WTO commitments on tariffs, see CHING 
CHEONG & CHING HUNG YEE, HANDBOOK ON CHINA’S WTO ACCESSION AND ITS 
IMPACTS 36–45 (2003). 
320 For a list of China’s WTO commitments on trade in services, see id. at 104–
07 (describing the commitments as well as the underlying principles for both 
horizontal and sectoral commitments). 
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within and without China.  With the elimination of many policy 
tools that used to be available to protect China’s domestic 
industries from multinational corporations, Chinese firms are to an 
increasing degree facing direct competition from multinational 
corporations, which are generally considered in China to be 
stronger competitors because of their advantages in financial 
resources, technologies, and management skills.  It is therefore not 
surprising that the alleged anticompetitive practices of Tetra Pak 
and possibly other multinational corporations received a strong 
reaction in China.  In retrospect, the aforementioned SAIC report 
perhaps overreacted to the Tetra Pak incident.  In most of the seven 
product groups or industries examined by the report, it grouped 
the market shares of all competing foreign companies together in 
arriving at the “dominant” market shares of those companies.  The 
report also did not offer any concrete evidence of foreign 
companies actually engaging in anticompetitive practices to 
increase or maintain their market shares.  Four years later, these 
flaws of the SAIC report were pointed out by a MOFCOM report 
published in March 2008.321
But at the time, the Tetra Pak incident and the SAIC report 
appeared to have led to a broad consensus that China needed a 
formal antitrust law as a precaution against anticompetitive 
practices of multinational corporations.  After the issuance of the 
2004 SAIC report, the drafting process for the AML accelerated,
 
322
The adoption of the AML, however, did not change the fact 
that there was still not a consensus on the need to have a formal 
antitrust law to deal with domestic competition issues.  In the post-
WTO era, China could not really enact an antitrust law that would 
apply to foreign firms only.  But subjecting domestic firms, 
particularly SOEs, to the new antitrust law would pose numerous 
conceptual and policy challenges.  In the last three years of the 
 
culminating in the adoption of the AML in August 2007. 
 
321 See Zhile Wang, Waizi Binggou Yu Guojia Jingji Anquan [Mergers and 
Acquisitions by Foreign Companies and National Economic Security], in ZHONGGUO 
WAISHANG TOUZI BAOGAO 2007 [REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA 2007], 
Mar. 21, 2008, http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wzyj/yjbg/zgwstzbg/2007 
chinainvestmentreport/t20080122_89094.htm. 
322 See Fanlongduan Fa Yunniang 10 Nian Jiasu Chutai; Waiqi Fanbo Longduan 
[Drafting of Antimonopoly Law Accelerates After Ten Years in the Making; Foreign 
Companies Rebut Monopoly Charges], BEIJING QINGNIAN BAO [BEIJING YOUTH DAILY], 
May 28, 2004, http://hyconference.edu.cn/chinese/law/574907.htm (reporting 
that the drafting of the AML accelerated upon the release of the SAIC report). 
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AML’s drafting process, therefore, efforts appeared to have been 
made to draft a law that would at least nominally conform to 
antitrust principles but would at the same time accommodate the 
status quo, rather than a law that would require the status quo to 
conform to antitrust principles.  One example of this “minimalist” 
approach of the AML is the ambiguity in the text of the AML about 
whether SOE monopolies are exempted from the AML.323
5. CONCLUSION 
  This 
minimalist approach is largely made necessary by China’s unique 
local conditions as discussed in this Article.  Before these local 
conditions become more compatible with a coherent competition 
policy, and before there is a consensus on the role of competition in 
the domestic sectors, the AML will likely remain a minimalist law, 
and China’s competition policy will likely continue being shaped 
more by ad hoc government action initiated outside of the AML 
than by the AML. 
This Article demonstrates that the transplant in China of a 
formal antitrust law in the mold of Western antitrust laws takes 
place under local conditions that are not entirely compatible with 
Western antitrust models.  These local conditions, chiefly the 
transitional stage China is currently in, China’s market structures, 
and pervasive state control in China’s economy, have limited the 
reach and applicability of the AML in all three major areas of 
antitrust:  cartels, abuse of dominant market position, and merger 
review.  With respect to cartels, widespread structural distortions 
caused by the roles of the government in the investment process 
and the exit barriers erected by the government have prevented 
China from pursuing a rigorous anti-cartel policy.  With respect to 
abuse of dominance, the focus of the AML on exclusionary abuses 
has led to a mismatch between monopoly abuses that are most 
prevalent in China’s economy and monopoly abuses that are 
prohibited under the AML.  With respect to merger review, 
China’s minimally concentrated market structures and long-
running policies favoring SOE mergers have prevented the AML 
from being meaningfully applied to domestic mergers.  In sum, 
despite having a Western-style antitrust law, China has not 
developed and likely will not develop Western-style antitrust 
jurisprudence in the near future due to these local conditions.   
 
323 See supra notes 236–37 and accompanying text. 
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But is the AML a wasted effort?  The answer to that question is 
a clear “no.”  The AML has at least forced China’s policymakers to 
ponder, perhaps for the first time, over questions about 
competition in a systematic manner.  It is true that the initial 
answers given by the AML to those questions were timid, but 
many of China’s far-reaching reforms started with steps that are 
even more timid.324
 
  Given how the Chinese-style incrementalism 
has worked in the past, it is still far too early to assess the eventual 
fate of antitrust regulation in China.  To a large extent, the future of 
the AML and Western antitrust models in China depends on how 
China’s local conditions will evolve in coming years.  In other 
words, with the adoption of the AML, the transplant of antitrust in 
China has not ended, but has just begun. 
 
324 In fact, China’s entire economic reforms were set in motion by a timid step 
taken by a group of farmers who made a secret pact among themselves in 1978 to 
contract out collectively owned lands.  See FENG CHEN, ECONOMIC TRANSITION AND 
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IN POST-MAO CHINA: IDEOLOGY AND REFORM 68 (1995). 
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